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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. 
PAM KAY BARRETT and JEFFREY 
TODD HUGHES, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
A 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
Case No. 981384-CA 
pODf > h Z 
BRIEF OP APPELLANT 
The matter comes before the Court from the Second Judicial 
District Court, numbers 981901020, 981901021, 981901023 and 
981901022, these cases having been consolidated by this Court in 
case number 981384-CA. Appellant Barrett was originally charged 
with violation of 58-37-8(2) U.C.A. (1953) as amended, a Second 
Degree Felony on March 6, 1998, for possession of a controlled 
substance (R. at Vol. IV P. 001); Count I, violation of 76-6-202 
U.C.A. (1953) as amended for burglary, a Third Degree Felony; Count 
II violation of 76-6-404, U.C.A. (1953) as amended, a Class A 
Misdemeanor for theft; Count III, violation of 76-6-202, U.C.A. 
(1953) as amended, for theft, a Third Degree Felony on March 6, 
1998; Count IV, violation of 76-6-404 U.C.A. (1953) as amended, for 
theft; Count V, violation of 76-6-202 U.C.A. (1953) as amended, for 
burglary, a Third Degree Felony; Count VI violation oJ f+LED 
U.C.A. (1953) as amended, for theft; Count VII, violation of 76-6- „ 
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and Count VIII in violation of 76-6-404, U.C.A. (1953) as amended, 
for theft which was dismissed May 5, 1998. (R. Vol. Ill P. 001-
008) 
Appellant Hughes was originally charged with violation of 58-
37-8(2) U.C.A. (1953) as amended, for possession of a controlled 
substance on March 6, 1998; violation of 76-6-202 U.C.A. (1953) as 
amended for burglary on March 6, 1998, a Third Degree Felony; 
violation of 76-6-404, U.C.A. (1953) as amended, a Class A 
Misdemeanor and violation of 76-6-202 U.C.A. (1953) as amended, a 
Third Degree Felony on March 6, 1998. (R. at 001-004 of each 
volume). On March 17, 1998, both Appellants plead not guilty to 
all charges after waiving their preliminary hearing. (R. at Vol. 
I P. 007, Vol. II at P. 038, Vol. Ill at 025 and Vol. IV at P. 
0 04) . Defense Attorney Martin Gravis on behalf of both Appellants, 
filed his Motion to Suppress evidence as a result of illegally 
obtaining evidence. (R. at Vol. II at P. 027) (R. at Vol. II P. 
001-008). Both Appellants agreed to plead to lesser offenses so 
long as the issue of Appellant's Suppression Motion and Judgment 
entered thereon could be presented to this Court for review as to 
whether evidence should have been excluded. 
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RANDINE SALERNO, #4137 
MAURICE RICHARDS, #2 73 6 
APPELLANT DIVISION 
PUBLIC DEFENDER ASSOCIATION, INC. 
OF WEBER COUNTY 
Attorneys for Defendant 
2568 Washington Boulevard, Suite 102 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: (801) 394-0231 / (801) 399-4191 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, / 
Plaintiff/Respondent, / 
vs. / Case No. 981384-CA 
PAM KAY BARRETT and JEFFREY / 
TODD HUGHES, 
• " / 
Defendant/Appellant. 
• / 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The matter comes before the Court from the Second Judicial 
District Court, numbers 981901020, 981901021, 981901023 and 
981901022, these cases having been consolidated by this Court in 
case number 981384-CA. Appellant Barrett was originally charged 
with violation of 58-37-8(2) U.C.A. (1953) as amended, a Second 
Degree Felony on March 6, 1998, for possession of a controlled 
substance (R. at Vol. IV P. 001); Count I, violation of 76-6-202 
U.C.A. (1953) as amended for burglary, a Third Degree Felony; Count 
II violation of 76-6-404, U.C.A. (1953) as amended, a Class A 
Misdemeanor for theft; Count III, violation of 76-6-202, U.C.A. 
1 
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(1953) as amended, for theft, a Third Degree Felony on March 6, 
1998/ Count IV, violation of 76-6-404 U.C.A. (1953) as amended, for 
theft; Count V, violation of 76-6-202 U.C.A. (1953) as amended, for 
burglary, a Third Degree Felony; Count VI violation of 76-6-404 
U.C.A. (1953) as amended, for theft; Count VII, violation of 76-6-
202 U.C.A. (1953) as amended, for burglary, a Third Degree Felony 
and Count VIII in violation of 76-6-404, U.C.A. (1953) as amended, 
for theft which was dismissed May 5, 1998. (R. Vol. Ill P. 001-
008) 
Appellant Hughes was originally charged with violation of 58-
37-8(2) U.C.A. (1953) as amended, for possession of a controlled 
substance on March 6, 1998; violation of 76-6-202 U.C.A. (1953) as 
amended for burglary on March 6, 1998, a Third Degree Felony; 
violation of 76-6-404, U.C.A. (1953) as amended, a Class A 
Misdemeanor and violation of 76-6-202 U.C.A. (1953) as amended, a 
Third Degree Felony on March 6, 1998. (R. at 001-004 of each 
volume). On March 17, 1998, both Appellants plead not guilty to 
all charges after waiving their preliminary hearing. (R. at Vol. 
I P. 007, Vol. II at P. 038, Vol. Ill at 025 and Vol. IV at P. 
004) . Defense Martin Gravis filed his Motion to Suppress evidence 
as a result of illegally obtaining evidence. (R. at Vol. II at P. 
027) (R. at Vol. II P. 001-008). Both Appellants agreed to plead 
to lesser offenses so long as the issue of Appellant's Suppression 
Motion and Judgment entered thereon could be presented to this 
Court for review as to whether evidence should have been excluded. 
Jurisdiction to hear the above entitled appeal is conferred 
2 
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upon Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to U.C.A. 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1953) 
as amended and Rule 26 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
The matter comes before the Court from the Second Judicial 
District Court, numbers 981901020, 981901021, 981901023 and 
981901022, these cases having been consolidated by this Court in 
case number 981384-CA. Appellant Barrett was originally charged 
with violation of 58-37-8(2) U.C.A. (1953) as amended, a Second 
Degree Felony on March 6, 1998, for possession of a controlled 
substance (R. at Vol. IV P. 001); Count I, violation of 76-6-202 
U.C.A. (1953) as amended for burglary, a Third Degree Felony; Count 
II violation of 76-6-404, U.C.A. (1953) as amended, a Class A 
Misdemeanor for theft; Count III, violation of 76-6-202, U.C.A. 
(1953) as amended, for theft, a Third Degree Felony on March 6, 
1998; Count IV, violation of 76-6-404 U.C.A. (1953) as amended, for 
theft; Count V, violation of 76-6-202 U.C.A. (1953) as amended, for 
burglary, a Third Degree Felony; Count VI violation of 76-6-404 
U.C.A. (1953) as amended, for theft; Count VII, violation of 76-6-
202 U.C.A. (1953) as amended, for burglary, a Third Degree Felony 
and Count VIII in violation of 76-6-404, U.C.A. (1953) as amended, 
for theft which was dismissed May 5, 1998. (R. Vol. Ill P. 001-
008) 
Appellant Hughes was originally charged with violation of 58-
37-8(2) U.C.A. (1953) as amended, for possession of a controlled 
substance on March 6, 1998; violation of 76-6-202 U.C.A. (1953) as 
amended for burglary on March 6, 1998, a Third Degree Felony; 
3 
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violation of 76-6-404, U.C.A. (1953) as amended, a Class A 
Misdemeanor and violation of 76-6-202 U.C.A. (1953) as amended, a 
Third Degree Felony on March 6, 1998. (R. at 001-004 of each 
volume). On March 17, 1998, both Appellants plead not guilty to 
all charges after waiving their preliminary hearing. (R. at Vol. 
I P. 007, Vol. II at P. 038, Vol. Ill at 025 and Vol. IV at P. 
0 04) . Defense Martin Gravis filed his Motion to Suppress evidence 
as a result of illegally obtaining evidence. (R. at Vol. II at P. 
027) (R. at Vol. II P. 001-008). Both Appellants agreed to plead 
to lesser offenses so long as the issue of Appellant's Suppression 
Motion and Judgment entered thereon could be presented to this 
Court for review as to whether evidence should have been excluded. 
On April 22, 1998, counsel argued his Motion to Suppress 
evidence obtained by way of an illegal search. Said Motion was 
denied. (R. at Vol. I at P. 013, Vol. II at P. 041 and 042, Vol. 
Ill at P. 055 and 056 and Vol. Ill at P. Oil). Please refer to 
Appellant's Addendum 1 incorporating all four Minutes of the 
Suppression Hearing. 
Defense counsel filed its Motion to Suppress and Memorandum in 
Support thereof on or about March 24, 1998. (R. at Vol. Ill, P. 
027) See Addendum 1.5. Appellant argued that the Affidavit in 
support of the warrant to search 5223 South 1900 West, Room 15, 
hereinafter referred to as the Circle R Motel in Roy, Utah, for 
illegal drugs was insufficient to support a Search Warrant 
authorizing the search of the room. The Affidavit and Search 
Warrant for property has been attached hereto as Appellant's 
4 
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Addendum 2 and incorporated herein by reference. (R. at Vol. Ill 
P. 036-039) The Affidavit and Search Warrant supporting a search 
of the motel room is attached hereto as Appellant's Addendum 3 and 
incorporated by reference. Both Affidavits in support of both 
Warrants are insufficient to justify a finding of probable cause. 
The Court denied Appellant's Motions. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
POINT 1 
Did the Affidavits in support of both Search 
Warrants lack the necessary allegation of 
probable cause to invalidate the subsequently 
issued search warrant? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
In reviewing the magistrate's finding of probable cause to 
support a search warrant based upon Affidavit, an Appellate Court 
will find the Warrant invalid only if the magistrate, given the 
totality of the circumstances, lacked a "substantial basis" for 
determining that probable cause existed. In conducting this 
review, the Appellate Court will consider the Search Warrant 
Affidavit in its entirety and in a common sense fashion and give 
great deference to the magistrate's decision. State v. Thurman, 
846 P. 2d 1256, 203 Utah Adv. Rep. 18 (Utah 1993) (Citations 
omitted) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Two search warrants were issued by the Honorable Stanton M. 
Taylor on the 5th day of March, 1998. An Affidavit for Search 
Warrant sworn to by Officer Mike Donehoo requested a Warrant to 
search for controlled substances. The facts establishing the 
5 
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grounds for the Warrant were listed as follows: 
Your Affiant, Office Mike Donehoo, is a police 
officer with Roy City Police Department and 
has been employed as a police officer for over 
18 years. I am currently assigned to the 
Weber County Morgan Narcotics Strike Force. 
I graduated from the Utah Police Officer 
Standard and Training in 1980. I received the 
officer of the year award from Roy City Police 
Department in 1991. 
I have received hundreds of training hours in 
narcotics training including training in 
Search Warrant preparation and execution. I 
have written over 50 Search Warrants and have 
investigated and supervised over 100 narcotics 
cases. 
I have received training and have personal 
knowledge through my experience in the use, 
sales and manufacturing of cocaine, crack 
cocaine, methamphetamine and marijuana, I know 
what items would most often be found at a 
premises where there are suspects using, 
selling or manufacturing any of these drugs 
and these items are those that I have listed 
in the description of items to be searched 
for. 
Within the last 24 hours, your Affiant has 
made a controlled purchase of methamphetamine 
with a confidential informant, hereafter 
referred to as CI #1 from David Lafevre in 
Room #15 of the Circle R Hotel, 5223 South 
1900 West, Roy, Utah. CI #1 was searched for 
„ contraband, none was found, and fitted with an 
electronic monitoring device. CI #1 was given 
an amount of money and then was followed by 
your Affiant to the address of 5223 South 1900 
West, Room 15, Roy, Utah. Your Affiant heard, 
through the electronic device, a voice asked 
for an amount of money for the 
methamphetamine. After a few minutes, CI #1 
left the room and met your Affiant at a pre-
designated location. CI #1 turned over a 
small zip-lock baggie of a substance which 
later tested positive for amphetamine. 
Your Affiant researched OPD records and found 
that David Lafevre was a suspect in a 
6 
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possession of Methamphetamine case handled by 
OPD officers. 
Methamphetamine has been purchased from the 
room within the last 24 hours. 
This confidential informant has given their 
full name and address. This confidential 
informant is volunteering this information and 
has not been promised anything in exchange for 
this information. This confidential informant 
has no criminal cases pending. This 
confidential informant is not a suspect in 
this case. This confidential informant is not 
a suspect in any case at this time. This 
confidential informant has provided 
information to agents in the past on police 
matters and the information has proven 
reliable. This confidential informant has 
been used by agents in the past on controlled 
drug purchases and has proven reliable. 
Another Affidavit for Search Warrant sworn to by Detective 
Bryson requested a Warrant to search for property. The facts 
establishing the grounds for the Warrant were listed as follows: 
You Affiant received information from a 
confidential informant that there was stolen 
property and drugs in unit #15 at the Circle R 
Motel. He has been to the motel in the past 
72 hours and has affirmed that this property 
is still in the room. 
Your affiant has been a Roy City Police 
Officer for 12 years, and has been a property 
crimes investigator for over one year. In the 
capacity of detective, I have made over 100 
arrests for property crimes. I have been 
trained in criminal investigation techniques 
during several courses sponsored by the Utah 
Peace Officers Standards and Training. Your 
Affiant has attended, and attained an 
Associate Degree in Criminal Justice, Law 
Enforcement emphasis, from Weber State 
University. 
On March 2, 1998, your Affiant received a 
telephone call from Detective Wakefield of 
Layton Police Department. He gave me 
information from a confidential informant. He 
7 
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has worked with this informant in the past, 
and has gained information that assisted in 
the closure of several criminal cases. 
Wakefield told me that the information the 
informant has provided in the past has been 
very reliable. 
On March 5, 1998, I spoke with Detective 
Donehoo of the Weber Morgan Narcotics Strike 
Force. Donehoo also indicated that this 
informant had provided reliable information to 
Detective Tony Garcia as well. 
The informant told me he saw a male known as 
Todd, bring boxes of property across the fence 
at Mollerup Storage Sheds, on the southwest 
corner. Mollerup is located at 1701 West 5300 
South, Roy. The CI said that Todd had a pair 
of bolt cutters under his coveralls, when he 
took the boxes to Todd's motel room at Circle 
R. Todd's room was full of computer 
equipment, stereo equipment, electronics and 
other property. The informant said that Todd 
was opening the boxes he brought from Mollerup 
and seemed surprised at the contents. 
I located footprints in the snow by the 
southwest corner of Mollerup, that went from 
inside Mollerup to the outside. There were 
reports of burglaries in these storage sheds 
over the weekend of February 28th. These 
facts corroborate facts given to me by the 
informant. 
On March 5, 1998, Detective Donehoo obtained a 
search warrant for drugs at this location. If 
upon entering the premises to assist Detective 
Donehoo, there is property located within the 
premises that appears to have been recently 
removed from storage, specifically boxed, or 
can be identified as possibly stolen from 
Mollerup, it is reqiiested that this property 
may also be seized as stolen property. 
Addendum 3.5 attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1 
Did the Affidavits in support of both Search 
Warrants lack the necessary allegation of 
8 
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probable cause to invalidate the subsequently-
issued search warrant? 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and 
Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution requires that Search 
Warrants be issued only with "probable cause", a standard requiring 
the issuing magistrate to make a reasonable determination whether 
"there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime 
will be found in a particular place." Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 
213, 238, reh'g denied, 463 U.S. 1237 (1983); see also State v. 
Babell, 770 P. 2d 987, 991 (Utah 1989) The Fourth Amendment 
requires that when a Search Warrant is issued on the basis of an 
Affidavit, that Affidavit must contain specific facts sufficient to 
support a determination by a neutral magistrate that probable cause 
exists. Babel, Id. at 990. The action of the magistrate, however, 
must not be a "mere ratification of the bare conclusions of 
others." Gates Supra at 462 U.S. at 239. See also Babel, at 770 
P. 2d at 990-91. Otherwise, the magistrate becomes only a "rubber 
stamp" for police, abandoning the neutral and detached role which 
is "a more reliable safeguard against improper searches than the 
hurried judgment of a law enforcement office." Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. 
v. New York, 442 U.S. 319, 326 (1979) (quoting United States v. 
Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1,9 (1977)). 
Thus, "reviewing Courts will not defer to a Warrant based on 
an Affidavit that does not provide the magistrate with a 
substantial basis for determining the existence of probable cause." 
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 915, reh'g denied, 468 U.S. 
1250 (1984) (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 239) . Even a Search 
9 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Warrant obtained under an officer's "objectively reasonable 
reliance," i.e., "good faith," cannot be validated if it is clear 
that the warrant is based on an Affidavit "so lacking in indicia of 
probable cause as to render official belief in its existence 
entirely unreasonable." Leon, 468 U.S. at 923 (quoting Brown v. 
Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 610-11 (1975)). 
In this case, the Affidavit for the Search Warrant for 
controlled substances indicated that a controlled buy of drugs was 
made from Room #15 of the Circle K Motel presumably from David 
Lafevre. The Affidavit does not state whether Lafevre was the 
registered motel guest in that room, was a registered guest at the 
time of the sale or if any other people had registered in that room 
at the time the Affidavit was executed or who occupied the room at 
the time of the sale of drugs. Without this information, the 
Affidavit fails to establish any likelihood that evidence of drugs 
was to be found in Room #15 and absolutely no indication that 
either Appellant was connected to the controverted buy and/or 
possession of any drugs merely by their entry into the room and/or 
during the time the search was being conducted. 
In the Affidavit for Search Warrant for the property, there is 
no mention of whether or not the property to be seized is evidence 
of crime, and in fact, the issuance of this Warrant is dependent 
upon items being found in the same room during the search for 
narcotics and the officers then being able to confirm those items 
were property stolen from Mollerup Storage. Again, this Affidavit 
fails to state who the registered guests are in the motel room, and 
10 
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if the guest on the 5th of March, 1998 are the same people who 
occupied the room within the last 72 hours. Also, the Affidavit 
fails to state what items have been stolen from Mollerup within the 
last ten days, thereby giving the Judge no information to determine 
whether or not the items to be seized were acquired by unlawful 
conduct as required by Utah Code Ann. Section 77-23-203 (1953) and 
Article I Section 14 of the Constitution of Utah. 
in Leon, the United States Supreme Court held that an officer 
could rely in good faith on a Search Warrant issued by a neutral 
magistrate, but said reliance must be in good faith, and the Court 
specifically held that certain deficiencies in the issuance of the 
Search Warrant would negate the good faith. One of the exceptions 
to the good faith rule is that the Affidavit is so lacking in 
indicia of probable cause that the officer cannot rely in good 
faith on the Search Warrant. As pointed out above, the first 
Search Warrant issued for the search for controlled substances 
failed to indicate whether or not David Lafevre was or had been a 
guest of the motel, and who the motel room was currently registered 
to at the time of the issuance of the Warrant. Since the purported 
sale of drugs was made by Mr. Lafevre, this information is vital in 
the determination as to whether probable cause existed at the time 
the Warrant was issued, and, in fact, if no one was residing in the 
room at the time of search, a Warrant would not even have been 
necessary since the owner of the motel could have consented to a 
search. If different individuals were residing in the room at the 
time of search, there would have be no probable cause to believe 
11 
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that those individuals possessed drugs. 
Further, as to the second search, that Affidavit is 
specifically contingent upon purported stolen property being found 
during the search for controlled substances, and Detective Bryson 
has stated in the police report that the information she had prior 
to the search for controlled substances was not sufficient to 
obtain a Search Warrant. Please refer to Bryson7s police report, 
attached hereto as Appellant's Addendum #4, incorporated herein by 
reference. 
Another exception to the Leon rules is whether the officer has 
misread the Judge or was reckless in the Affidavit. 
The officers have failed to state in either Affidavit that 
Detective Bryson determined that the person to whom the room was 
registered prior to March 5, 1998 was David Lafevre. In addition, 
said determination was purportedly made on March 3, 1998, but all 
contact that the confidential informant had was with the 
Defendants, Jeffrey Todd Hughes and Pam Kay Barrett, who were not 
residents of Room 15. 
Even though the officers knew the room was registered to David 
Lafevre, they were reckless in the Affidavit by failing to state 
that there was no indication that David Lafevre was actually 
residing in the motel room at the time of the alleged drug 
transaction. In fact, there is no indication that they made 
further inquiry as to whether or not Mr. Lafevre was still the 
registered guest in the room or if the Defendants were, in fact, 
the registered guests in the room. The officers also failed to 
12 
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inform the Court whether the alleged drug transaction was set up 
through the Appellant, Jeffrey Todd Hughes, or Mr. Lafevre. 
It is well settled that "before issuing a Search Warrant, a 
neutral magistrate must review an Affidavit containing specific 
facts sufficient to support a finding of probable cause." State v. 
Purser, 828 P.2d 515, 517 (Utah App. 1992) (citing State v. Babel, 
770 P.2d 987, 990 (Utah 1989)). In determining whether probable 
cause exists, the magistrate must "make a practical, common-sense 
decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the 
Affidavit before him, including the 'veracity' and 'basis of 
knowledge' of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a 
fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be 
found in a particular place" (emphasis added). Illinois v. Gates, 
462 U.S. 213, 239, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2232, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983). 
There were no current facts in the Affidavit for a Warrant to 
search for drugs in Room 15 that support the conclusion that there 
was a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime would 
be found in the motel room at the time of the search. 
The Affidavit and Search Warrant which purports to authorize 
a search for drugs in Room #15, attached hereto as Appellant's 
Addendum #3, incorporated herein by reference, are both fatally 
deficient. The facts offered to support the issuance of the Search 
Warrant do not support a finding of probable cause to believe that 
illegal drugs were being passed or sold by Appellants in Room #15 
on the day the Warrant was issued, to-wit: March 5, 1998. The 
evidence seized from Room 15 must be suppressed because the Warrant 
13 
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does not base its order on any particularity contained in the 
Affidavit. The Court's Warrant is merely a general Warrant which 
authorizes a search from an Affidavit which states no probable 
cause. As such, its issuance violates Utah statutory law, and, 
more importantly, fundamental rights granted under both the Federal 
and State Constitutions. Utah Code Annotated Section 77-23-201 
states: 
A Search Warrant is an order issued by a 
magistrate in the name of the state and 
directed to a peace officer, describing with 
particularity the thing, place or person to be 
searched and the property of evidence to be 
seized by him and brought before the 
magistrate. (Emphasis added). 
Utah Code Annotated Section 77-23-203 states in relevant part: 
(1) A Search Warrant shall not issue except 
upon probable cause supported by oath or 
affirmation particularly describing the person 
or place to be search and the person property, 
or evidence to be seized. (Emphasis added). 
Both the Fourth Amendment: to the United States Constitution 
and Article I Section 14 of the Utah Constitution require that "no 
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or 
affirmation and particularly describe the... things to be seized." 
(Emphasis added). The Utah Court has said: 
This portion of the amendment is essentially a 
proscription against general Warrants whereby 
administrative officers determine what is and 
what is not to be seized. The decision to 
seize must be judicial, as opposed to 
administrative, and the Warrant must be 
sufficiently particular to guide the officer 
to the thing intended to be seized, thereby 
minimizing the danger of unwarranted invasion 
of privacy. Accordingly, the line between 
what is and what is not sufficiently 
particular must be drawn with a view to 
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accomplishment of the constitutional purpose 
and necessarily varies with the circumstances 
and with the nature of the property to be 
seized. State v. Galleaos, 712 P.2d 207 (Utah 
1985) 
Clearly, the Warrant issued in this case was no more than a 
general Warrant when it allowed the seizure of evidence of "illegal 
conduct" and based upon the hearsay comments of a C.I. that within 
the last 72 hours, he had seen stolen property and drugs. Also, 
since the officers alluded there has been recent burglaries, serial 
numbers should have been included, or at least property should have 
been more particularly described. 
At the very least, there should have been references to 
specific burglaries from which specific items, known to be stolen 
and for which the officers had probable cause to believe were 
stolen, included in the Affidavit in support of the Search Warrant 
because an officer requesting a Search Warrant must describe with 
particularity the items to be seized. Although the Warrant is more 
clear and specific then the Affidavit in support thereof, this 
writer cannot see how the Court came up with the decision to search 
for the described drugs and so*forth, since these descriptions are 
not mentioned in the Affidavit which was presumably supporting the 
Warrant. 
Just as disturbing is the magistrate's signing of a Search 
Warrant for something as nondescript as "Methamphetamine pipes and 
other drug paraphernalia". Utah Code Annotated Section 58-37a-3 
defines "drug paraphernalia" as "any equipment, product or material 
used, or intended for use, to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, 
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harvest, manufacture, compound, convert, produce, process, prepare, 
test, analyze, package, repackage, store, contain, conceal, inject, 
ingest, inhale, or to otherwise introduce a controlled substance 
into the human body..." It is evident from this description that 
almost anything could be classified as "drug paraphernalia." 
Since there is no statute prohibiting methamphetamine pipes 
specifically, they too must fall under the overly broad and vague 
umbrella of "drug paraphernalia". But, while a reference to 
methamphetamine pipes may be somewhat more specific in describing 
a type of drug paraphernalia, there is no description of what the 
pipes themselves might look like. Presumably, any pipe at all 
could be a "methamphetamine pipe" if it was used to inhale 
methamphetamine. Avoiding the obvious problem of not being able to 
identify any pipe as a methamphetamine pipe until an analysis of 
the contents or residue confirms methamphetamine, an officer 
requesting a Search Warrant must describe with particularity the 
items to be seized and why. If the Affiant's general reference to 
a pipe is accepted as sufficient to satisfy the issuance of a 
Search Warrant, then any pipe found would also justify an arrest 
for possession of "drug paraphernalia". 
CONCLUSION 
Article I Section 14 of the Constitution of Utah requires that 
searches be conducted pursuant to a Search Warrant based upon 
probable cause, and if the Affidavit is insufficient to establish 
probable cause, the evidence must be suppressed. Under United 
States v. Leon, evidence obtained during a search pursuant to a 
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Warrant when the Affidavit for the search does not establish 
probable cause may not be suppressed unless the Affidavit for the 
Search Warrant is so lacking in indicia of probable cause, or the 
officer made reckless statements or withheld information in the 
Affidavit so that he could not have reasonably acted in good faith 
in the search. Since in this case the Affidavits fail to establish 
probable cause and are so lacking in indicia of probable cause, and 
the officers recklessly withheld information from the Judge in this 
determination of probable cause, the searches were illegal and the 
statements obtained from the Defendants were "fruits of the 
poisonous tree", and all evidence obtained from the searches and 
the statements of the Defendants must be suppressed. 
DATED this ^ I day of December, 1998. 
-y-^ -^ c^ c-^  ^fe-tt 
' RANDINE SALERNO, 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OP MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the above and 
foregoing Brief of Appellant was posted in the United States mail, 
postage prepaid on this <^) day of December, 1998 and addressed 
to: 
Jan Graham 
Attorney General 
Heber M. Wells Building 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
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SECOND DISTRICT COURT - OGDEN COURT 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
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SECOND DISTRICT COURT - OGDEN COURT 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JEFFERY TODD HUGHES, 
Defendant. 
PRESENT 
Clerk: dianew 
Prosecutor: BRENDA J. BEATON 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): MARTIN GRAVIS (PDA) 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: December 3, 1966 
Video 
Tape Number: D0422 Tape Count: 343 
CHARGES 
1. BURGLARY - 3rd Degree Felony 
2. THEFT - Class A Misdemeanor 
3. BURGLARY - 3rd Degree Felony 
4. THEFT - 3rd Degree Felony 
5. BURGLARY - 3rd Degree Felony 
6. THEFT - 3rd Degree Felony 
7. BURGLARY - 3rd Degree Felony 
8. THEFT - Class B Misdemeanor 
SUPPRESSION HEARING 
NOTICE 
Case No: 981901023 FS 
Judge: ROGER S. DUTSON 
Date: Aoril 22. 1 QQS 
Page 1 
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Case No: 981901023 
Date: Apr 22, 1998 
HEARING 
Counsel give argument on defense r.czion to suppress search 
warrant. Court takes matter under advisement. Matter continued to 
April 28, 1998 for court's decision. Total bail on this case and 
case 981901022 FS to remain set at 515,000.00. 
DECISION is scheduled. 
Date: 04/28/1998 
Time: 09:24 a.m. 
Location: 3rd Floor Northwest 
Second District Courz 
2525 Grant Avenue 
Ogden, UT 84401 
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SECOND DISTRICT COURT - OGDEN COURT 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
PAM KAY BARRETT, 
Defendant. 
MINUTES 
SUPPRESSION HEARING 
NOTICE 
Case No: 981901021 FS 
Judge: ROGER S. DUTSON 
Date: April 22, 1998 
PRESENT 
Clerk: dianew 
Prosecutor: BRENDA J. BEATON 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): MARTIN GRAVIS (PDA) 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: November 2, 1953 
Video 
Tape Number: D0422 Tape Count: 343 
CHARGES 
1. BURGLARY - 3rd Degree Felony 
2. THEFT - CLASS A - Class A Misdemeanor 
3. BURGLARY - 3rd Degree Felony 
4. THEFT - 3rd Degree Felony 
5. BURGLARY - 3rd Degree Felony 
6. THEFT - 3rd Degree Felony 
7. BURGLARY - 3rd Degree Felony 
8. THEFT - Class B Misdemeanor 
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Date : 
981901021 
Apr 22, 1998 
HEARING 
Counsel give argument on defense motion to suppress search 
warrant. Court takes matter under advisement. Matter continued to 
April 28, 1998 for court's decision. Total bail on this case and 
case 981901020 FS to remain set at $15,000.00. 
DECISION is scheduled. 
Date: 04/28/1998 
Time: 09:24 a.m. 
Location: 3rd Floor Northwest 
Second District Court 
2 52 5 Grant Avenue 
Ogden, UT 84401 
Page 2 (last) 
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SECOND DISTRICT COURT - OGDEN COURT 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
PAM KAY BARRETT, 
Defendant 
MINUTES 
SUPPRESSION HEARING 
NOTICE 
Case No: 981901020 FS 
Judge: ROGER S. DUTSON 
Date: April 22, 1998 
PRESENT 
Clerk: dianew 
Prosecutor: BRENDA J. BEATON 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): MARTIN GRAVIS (PDA) 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: November 2, 1953 
Video 
Tape Number: D0422 Tape Count: 343 
CHARGES 
1. ILLEGAL POSS/USE OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE - 2nd Degree Felony 
Plea: Not Guilty 
HEARING 
Counsel give argument on defense motion to suppress search 
warrant. Court finds probable cause and denies that motion. Matter 
continued to April 28, 1998 to discuss resetting of jury trial. 
Total bail for this case and case 981901021 FS to remain set at 
$15,000.00. 
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PUBLIC DEFENDER ASSOCIATION, 
INC. OF WEBER COUNTY 
Attorneys for Defendant 
2568 Washington Blvd., Suite 203 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: (801) 392-8247 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH, OGDEN DEPARTMENT 
STATE OF UTAH, : MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
AND MEMORANDUM IN 
Plaintiff, : SUPPORT THEREOF 
vs. 
PAM KAY BARRETT, : Case No. 981901020 
JEFFREY TODD HUGHES, 981901021 
981901022 
981901023 
Defendant. : Judge Dutson 
COME NOW the Defendants, Pam Kay Barrett and Jeffrey Todd Hughes, by and through 
their attorney, Martin V. Gravis, and hereby move the Court to suppress the evidence obtained in 
the illegal search of the Defendants. Said Motion is based upon the Fourth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution, and Article I Section 14 of the Constitution of 
Utah, and is supported by the following Memorandum. 
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MEMORANDUM 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Two search warrants were issued by the Honorable Stanton M. Taylor on the 5th day of 
March, 1998. An affidavit for search warrant sworn to by Officer Mike Donehoo requested a 
warrant to search for controlled substances. The facts establishing the grounds for the warrant 
were listed as follows: 
Your Affiant, officer Mike Donehoo, is a police officer with Roy City 
Police Department and has been employed as a police officer for over eighteen 
years. I am currently assigned to the Weber Morgan Narcotics Strike Force. 
I graduated from the Utah Police Officer Standard and Training in 1980. I 
received the officer of the year award from Roy City Police Department in 1991. 
I have received hundreds of training hours in narcotics training including training in 
search warrant preparation and execution. I have written over fifty search 
warrants and have investigated and supervised over one hundred narcotics cases. 
I have received training and have personal knowledge through my experience in 
the use, sales, and manufacturing of cocaine, crack cocaine, methamphetamine, 
and marijuana, I know what items would most often be found at a premises where 
there are suspects using selling or manufacturing any of these drugs and these 
items are those that I have listed in the description of items to be searched for. 
Within the last 24 hours your Affiant has made a controlled purchase of 
methamphetamine with a confidential informant hereafter referred to as CI #1 from 
David Lafevre in room #15 of the Circle R hotel, 5223 South 1900 West, Roy, 
Utah. CI #1 was searched for contraband, none was found, and fitted with an 
electronic monitoring device. CI #1 was given an amount of money and then was 
followed by Your Affiant to the address of 5223 South 1900 West, room 15, Roy, 
Utah. Your Affiant heard, through the electronic device, a voice asked for an 
amount of money for the methamphetamine. After a few minutes CI #1 left the 
room and met Your Affiant at a pre-designated location. CI #1 turned over a 
small zip-lock baggie of a substance which later tested positive for amphetamine. 
Your Affiant researched OPD records and found that David Lafevre was a suspect 
in a possession of Methamphetamine case handled by OPD officers. 
Methamphetamine has been purchased from the room within the last 24 hours. 
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This confidential informant has given their full name and address. This confidential 
informant is volunteering this information and has not been promised anything in 
exchange for this information. This confidential informant has no criminal cases 
pending. This confidential informant is not a suspect in this case. This confidential 
informant is not a suspect in any case at this time. This confidential informant has 
provided information to agents in the past on police matters and the information 
has proven reliable. This confidential informant has been used by agents in the past 
on controlled drug purchases and has proven reliable. 
Another affidavit for search warrant sworn to by Detective Bryson requested a warrant to search 
for property. The facts establishing the grounds for the warrant were listed as follows: 
Your Affiant received information from a confidential informant that there 
was stolen property and drugs in unit #15 at the Circle R Motel, he has been to 
the motel in the past 72 hours and has affirmed that this property is still in the 
room. 
Your Affiant has been a Roy City police officer for twelve years, and has been a 
property crimes investigator for over one year. In the capacity of detective I have 
made over one hundred arrests for property crimes. I have been trained in criminal 
investigation techniques during several courses sponsored by the Utah Peace 
Officers Standards and Training. Your Affiant has attended, and attained an 
associate degree in Criminal Justice, Law Enforcement emphasis, from Weber 
State University. 
On 3-2-98, Your Affiant received a telephone call from Detective Wakefield of 
Layton P.D. He gave me information from a confidential informant. He has 
worked with this informant in the past, and has gained information that assisted in 
the closure of several criminal cases. Wakefield told me that the information the 
informant has provided in the past has been very reliable. 
On March 5, 1998, I spoke with Detective Donehoo of the Weber Morgan 
Narcotics Strike Force. Donehoo also indicated that this informant had provided 
reliable information to Detective Tony Garcia as well. 
The informant told me he saw a male known to him as Todd, bring boxes of 
property across the fence at Mollerup storage sheds, on the southwest corner. 
Mollerup is located at 1701 West 5300 South, Roy. The C.I. said that Todd had a 
pair of bolt cutters under his coveralls, when he took the boxes to Todd's motel 
room at Circle R. Todd's room was frill of computer equipment, stereo 
equipment, electronics, and other property. The informant said that Todd was 
opening the boxes he brought from Mollerup, and seemed surprised at the 
contents. 
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I located footprints in the snow by the southwest corner of Mollerup, that went 
from inside Mollerup to the outside. There were reports of burglaries in these 
storage sheds over the weekend of February 28. These facts corroborate facts 
given to my by the informant. 
On March 5, 1998, Detective Donehoo obtained a search warrant for drugs at this 
location. If upon entering the premises to assist Detective Donehoo, there is 
property located within the premises that appears to have been recently removed 
from storage, specifically boxed, or can be identified as possibly stolen from 
Mollerup, it is requested that this property may also be seized as stolen property. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT ISSUED FOR THE SEARCH FOR 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES DOES NOT ESTABLISH PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THE 
ISSUANCE OF THE SEARCH WARRANT PURSUANT TO ARTICLE I SECTION 14 OF 
THE CONSTITUTION OF UTAH. 
The Utah Supreme Court has not adopted the good faith exception as outlined in United 
States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984), for the requirement that a 
search warrant be issued only upon the existence of probable cause under Article I Section 14 of 
the Constitution of Utah. (See Sims v. Utah State Tax Commission. 841 P.2d 6 (Utah 1992)). 
However, the Supreme Court has held that Article I Section 14 of the Constitution of Utah may 
be interpreted differently than the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. (See 
State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990)) 
The affidavit for the search warrant for controlled substances indicated that a controlled 
buy of drugs was made from a motel room at 5223 South 1900 West, room #15, Roy Utah, from 
David Lafevre. The affidavit does not state whether or not David Lafevre is the registered guest 
in that room, or that he was a registered guest at the time of the sale, nor does it state who the 
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registered people are in the room and if the room is still occupied by the same individuals who 
occupied it at the time of the sale. Without said information, the affidavit fails to establish 
probable cause that the evidence which the officers were searching for is likely to be found in the 
place to be searched. 
In State v. South, 932 P.2d 622 (Utah App. 1997), the Court stated that 'the scope of the 
lawful search is limited to the 'places in which there is probable cause to believe that it [the 
evidence] may be found.'" Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 107 S.Ct. 1013, 1016, 94 L.Ed.2d 
72 (1987) (quoting United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 824, 102 S.Ct. 2157, 2172, 72 L.ed.2d 
572(1982)). 
POINT II 
THE AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT FOR THE PROPERTY FAILS TO 
ESTABLISH PROBABLE CAUSE OF THE ISSUANCE OF SAID WARRANT PURSUANT 
TO ARTICLE I SECTION 14 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF UTAH. 
In the Affidavit for Search Warrant for the property, there is no mention of whether or not 
the property to be seized is evidence of crime, and in fact the issuance of this warrant is dependent 
upon items being found in the same room during the search for narcotics and the officers then 
being able to confirm those items were property stolen from Mollerup Storage. Again this 
affidavit fails to state who the registered guests are in the motel room, and if the guest on the 5th 
of March, 1998, are the same people who occupied the room within the last 72 hours. Also the 
affidavit fails to state what items have been stolen from Mollerup within the last ten days thereby 
giving the judge no information to determine whether or not the items to be seized were acquired 
by unlawful conduct as required by Utah Code Ann. Section 77-23-203 (1995) and Article I 
Section 14 of the Constitution of Utah. 
A n * 
U O -
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POINT III 
EVEN IF THE COURT WERE TO DETERMINE THAT LEON APPLIES UNDER 
THE UTAH CONSTITUTION, THE SEARCH IS STILL ILLEGAL UNDER BOTH THE 
UTAH AND UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION BASED UPON UNITED STATES V. 
LEON IN THAT THE AFFIDAVITS ARE SO LACKING IN INDICIA OF PROBABLE 
CAUSE THAT A REASONABLE OFFICER COULD NOT IN GOOD FAITH RELY UPON 
THE SEARCH WARRANT. 
In Leon, the United States Supreme Court held that an officer could rely in good faith on 
a search warrant issued by a neutral magistrate, but said reliance must been in good faith, and the 
Court specifically held that certain deficiencies in the issuance of the search warrant would negate 
the good faith. One of the exceptions to the good faith rule is that the affidavit is so lacking in 
indicia of probable cause that the officer cannot rely in good faith on the search warrant. As 
pointed out above, the first search warrant issued for the search for controlled substances failed to 
indicate whether or not David Lafevre was or had been a guest of the motel, and who the motel 
room was currently registered to at the time of the issuance of the warrant. Since the purported 
sale of drugs was made by Mr. Lafevre, this information is vital in the determination as to whether 
probable cause existed at the time the warrant was issued, and in fact if no one was residing in the 
room at the time of the search, a warrant would not even have been necessary since the owner of 
the motel could have consented to a search. If different individuals were residing in the room at 
the time of the search, there would be no probable cause to believe that those individuals 
possessed drugs. 
Further, as to the second search, that affidavit is specifically contingent upon purported 
stolen property being found during the search for controlled substances, and Detective Bryson has 
f\ ^ -; 
v «„» ^ 
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stated in the police report that the information she had prior to the search for controlled 
substances was not sufficient to obtain a search warrant. 
POINT IV 
ANOTHER EXCEPTION TO THE LEON RULE IS WHETHER THE OFFICER HAS 
MISLEAD THE JUDGE OR MAGISTRATE OR WAS RECKLESS IN THE AFFIDAVIT. 
The officers have failed to state in either affidavit that Detective Bryson determined that 
the person to whom the room was registered prior to March 5, 1998, was David Lafevre, and said 
determination was made on March 3, 1998, but that all contact that the confidential informant had 
was with the Defendants, Jeffrey Todd Hughes and Pam Kay Barrett, prior to the alleged drug 
sale. Further, that this contact was made in room #15 and the confidential informant was with the 
Defendants in the room on two occasions on the 27th of February, 1998. 
Even though the officers knew the room was registered to David Lafevre, they were 
reckless in the affidavit by failing to state that there was no indication that David Lafevre was 
actually residing in the motel room at the time of the alleged drug transaction. In fact, there is no 
indication that they made further inquiry as to whether or not Mr. Lafevre was still the registered 
guest in the room or if the Defendant's were in fact the registered guests in the room. The 
officers also failed to inform the Court that the alleged drug transaction was set up through the 
Defendant, Jeffrey Todd Hughes, and not Mr. Lafevre. 
POINT V 
THE SUBSEQUENT STATEMENTS MADE BY THE DEFENDANTS SHOULD BE 
SUPPRESSED PURSUANT TO THE "FRUIT OF THE POISONOUS TREE" DOCTRINE. 
In the case of Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 475 (1963), the United States 
Supreme court held that evidence derived from prior illegal conduct of the police should be 
P n r) 
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suppressed unless there is a sufficient attenuation from the illegal conduct to the discovery of the 
evidence. 
In this ease there are i 10 attei 11 lating circumstance ---r * ,fv Defendants were v -^..-. 
under arrest at the time of the illegal search and were subsequently questioned at the police 
station. Furthermore, the officer had no independent probable cause to arrest the Defendant's but 
for the evidence found during the searches. Therefore, any statements made by the Defendants to 
the police are "fruits of the poisonous tree" and therefore should be suppressed. 
CONCLUSION 
Article I Section 14 of the Constitution of Utah requires that searches be conducted 
pursuant to a search warrant based upon probable cause, and if the affidavit is insufficient to 
establish probable cause, the evidence shoi lid be suppressed I Inder United States v. Leon, 
evidence obtained during a search pursuant to a warrant when the affidavit for the search does not 
establish probable cause may not be suppressed unless the affidavit for the search warrant is so 
lacking in indicia of probable cause, or the officer made reckless statements or withheld 
information in the affidavits so that he could not have reasonably acted in good faith in the search. 
Since in this ease the affidavits fail to establish probable cai lse, anci are so lacking in indicia of 
probable cause, and the officers recklessly withheld information from the judge in his 
determination of probable cause, the searches were illegal and the statements obtained from the 
Defendants were "fruits of the poisonous tree", and all evidence obtained from the searches and 
the statements of the Defendants should be suppressed. 
DATED this^jth day of /^M^k^l998 
MAlCTfN V. GRAVIS (#1237) 
Attornev for Defendant 
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CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I did hand deliver a true and correct copy of the foregoing Motion to 
Suppress and Memorandum in Si ipport 1 hereof this^rth da> of lyyjs •.'.!.•• •- A. 
Parmley, Deputy Weber County Attorney, 2380 Washington Blvd., 2nd Floor, Ogden, Utah 
84401. 
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• SECOND JUDICIAL U i b 1 R I C T COURT ^gaj-
• W E B E R COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SEARCH WARR AN I 
• TO ANY PEACE OFFICER IN THE STATE OF UTAH: 
• Proof by affidavit under oath having been made this day before me by: DETECTIVE BRYSON, I am 
satisfied that there is probable cause to believe that: 
On the premise(s) of: 
• 1701 WEST RIVERDALE ROAD, UNIT #550, ROY, UTAH, A STORAGE SHED LOCATED AT 
THE MOLLERUP, SECURITY MINI STORAGE FACILITY, THE UNIT IS #550, THE NUMBER 
IS PAINTED ON THE CEMENT FLOOR BELOW THE DOOR TO THE UNIT. THE BUILDING 
THE UNIT IS LOCATED IN IS THE THIRD BUILDING SOUTH OF THE PFFTC* HN THE 
EAST SIDE OF THIS BUILDING., 
• In the City of ROY CITY, County of WEBER COUNTY, State of UTAH, there is now being possessed or 
concealed certain property or evidence described as: 
• • CAMPING EQUIPMENT, A MICROWAVE OVEN, BOXES AND CONTAINERS OF 
CLOTHING AND HOUSEHOLD GOODS. 
Which property or evidence: 
• • Was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed. 
• • Is evidence of illegal conduct. 
•
 YOU ARE THEREFORE COMMANDED 
In the daytime. 
To make a search of the above named or described person(s), premise(s) and vehicle(s) for the herein above 
described person, property or evidence, and if you find the same, or any part thereof, to bring it forthwith 
before me at the, County of WEBER COUNTY, State of UTAH, or retain such property in your custody 
subject to the order of this court. 
• SUBSCRIBED, AND SWOR54 TO BEFORE W 
• 
! Q 
this <g^ day of v 
4lo7M 
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JDKJAL DISTRICT COURT 
J EK COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
Xtwr; 
^0^FIDA\ .' i H u< M-: w i i w uw ^ r 
l f g | ^ | & g n e d being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
That th- « ' '•N is reason to believe that: 
That on the premise(s) known as: 
MOLLERUP, SECURITY MINI STORGAGE, 1701 WEST RTVERDALE ROAD, UNIT #550, ROY, 
UTAH. THE SHED IS MARKED #550, BY A PAINTED NUMBER ON THE CEMENT FLOOR 
BELOW THE DOOR OF THE UNIT. THE BUILDING THE UNIT IS LOCATED IN IS THE THIRD 
BUILDING SOUTH OF THE OFFICE, IN THE EAST PORTION OF THE BUILDING. 
In the City of ROY CITY, County of WEBER COUNTY, State of UTAH, there is now certain property or 
evidence described as: 
CAMPING EQUIPMENT, A MICROWAVE OVEN, BOXES AND CONTAINERS OF CLOTHING 
HOUSEHOLD GOODS, ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT, TOOLS, AND ANY OTHER CONTENTS OF THE 
STORAGE SHED. 
That said property or evidence: 
Was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed. 
Is evidence of illegal conduct. 
The facts establishing the grounds for issuance of a search warrant are attached hereto and incorporated herein. 
Your AFFIANT has been a Roy City Police officer for twelve years, and has been a property crimes investigator 
for over one year. In the capacity of detective, your AFFIANT has made over one hundred arrests for property 
crimes. I have been trained in criminal investigation techniques, and search and seizure laws and procedure, during 
several courses sponsored by the Utah Peace Officers Standards and Training. I hold an associates degree in 
Criminal Justice, and will complete a bachelor degree in the same field on June 11, 1998. I have written and served 
four prior search warrants that resulted in recovery of stolen property, and prosecution of those in possession of 
said property. 
ON 3-5-98, JEFFERY TODD HUGHES AND PAMELA BARRETT WERE ARRESTED FOR 
BURGLARIES AT THE MOLLERUP FACILITY. BARRETT AND HUGHES RENTED STORAGE SHED 
#550 AT MOLLERUP, BOTH NAMES ARE ON THE TOP OF THE CONTRACT, THE SIGNATURE IS 
THAT OF PAMELA BARRETT. BARRETT AND HUGHES TOLD YOUR AFFIANT THEY ARE 
BOYFRIEND AND GIRLFRIEND TO EACH OTHER. THEY HAVE LIVED TOGETHER FOR AT LEAST 
THE LAST SIX MONTHS. AT THE TIME OF ARREST THEY WERE LIVING AT THE CIRCLE R 
MOTEL IN ROY. PRIOR TO THIS THEY WERE LIVING IN A MOTOR VEHICLE. 
Search Warrant Affidavit - Page 1 
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w 
ON 3-5-98, WHEN BARRETT AND HUGHES WERE READ MIRANDA, HUGHES TOLD ME HE HAD 
STOLEN ITEMS, AND PUT THEM IN HIS STORAGE SHED #550 AT MOLLERUP. HE THEN EITHER 
SOLD THE ITEMS, OR MOVED THEM TO THE MOTEL HE AND PAM WERE LIVING IN. HE SIGNED 
A WRITTEN CONSENT TO SEARCH THE SHED, AND HE PERSONALLY REMOVED NUMEROUS 
ITEMS, INFORMING ME AS HE DID SO, THE ITEMS WERE STOLEN. HUGHES TOLD ME HE HAD 
BEEN TAKING ITEMS FROM STORAGE SHEDS. AT MOLLERUP FOR SEVERAL MONTHS, SINCE 
ABOUT AUGUST OF 1997. AFTER HUGHES FINISHED REMOVING THE ITEMS THAT HE ADMITTED 
WERE STOLEN, HE LOCKED THE SHED WITH HIS PADLOCK. AT THAT TIME, THE SHED WAS 
APPROXIMATELY THREE FOURTHS OF THE WAY FULL, THERE WERE AT LEAST ONE HUNDRED 
ITEMS WITHIN THE SHED. 
AFTER MIRANDA, BARRETT TOLD ME THAT WHEN THEY RENTED THE SHED HUGHES PUT 
THEIR PROPERTY IN THE SHED. SHE SAID THEY DIDN'T HAVE MUCH PROPERTY, AND THAT 
IF THERE WERE STILL NUMEROUS ITEMS OF PROPERTY IN THE SHED, THAT IT TOO WAS 
PROBABLY STOLEN. 
ON MARCH 21, 1998 NINETEEN VICTIMS OF BURGLARY AT MOLLERUP CAME TO ROY P.D. 
AND IDENTIFIED PROPERTY AS THEIR OWN, THAT HAD BEEN SEIZED FROM HUGHES AND 
BARRETT. OVER THE PERIOD THAT HUGHES TOLD YOUR AFFIANT HE HAD BEEN TAKING 
ITEMS FROM SHEDS AT MOLLERUP, WHICH WAS FROM AUGUST OF 1997 TO MARCH 5, 1998, 
THERE WERE FORTY SIX REPORTED BURGLARIES AT MOLLERUP. THERE WERE AT LEAST 
ANOTHER TEN BURGLARIES THAT HAVE NOT YET BEEN REPORTED, AS THE VICTIMS HAVE 
NOT BEEN LOCATED. BECAUSE THE VICTIMS HAVE NOT USED THE ITEMS IN THEIR SHEDS ON 
A REGULAR BASIS, AND SOME ITEMS ARE INHERITED, OR STORED FOR FAMILY MEMBERS OR 
OTHERS, THEY CAN NOT PROVIDE COMPLETE LISTS OF STOLEN PROPERTY. THE VICTIMS 
HAVE, IN SEVERAL CASES, DISCOVERED ADDITIONAL PROPERTY HAD BEEN STOLEN, AFTER 
HAVING FILED THEIR POLICE REPORT. WITHOUT ALLOWING THE VICTIMS TO LOOK AT THE 
PROPERTY, IT CAN NOT BE DETERMINED WHO THE ACTUAL OWNERS OF THE PROPERTY ARE. 
WHEN THE RECOVERED PROPERTY WAS SHOWN TO VICTIMS, ALTHOUGH THERE WERE 
OVER TWO HUNDRED AND TWENTY ITEMS THAT HAD BEEN SEIZED, THERE WERE NUMEROUS 
ITEMS THAT WERE IDENTIFIED, BUT THERE ARE STILL HUNDREDS OF ITEMS THAT WERE 
STOLEN THAT HAVE NOT BEEN RECOVERED. SOME OF THIS PROPERTY MAY STILL BE IN SHED 
#550 AT MOLLERUP. 
ON APRIL 3, 1998, YOUR AFFIANT OBTAINED A COMPUTERIZED PRINTOUT OF THE ACCESS 
CODES USED TO ENTER THE MOLLERUP STORAGE COMPOUND. THE CODE GIVEN TO HUGHES 
AND BARRETT HAD NOT BEEN USED SINCE MARCH5,1998. HUGHES AND BARRETT HAVE BEEN 
HOUSED IN THE WEBER COUNTY JAIL SINCE MARCH 5, AND HAVE NOT HAD ACCESS TO THE 
SHED. 
ON APRIL 3, 1998, TRACY TIMAS, AN EMPLOYEE AT MOLLERUP, ASKED YOUR AFFIANT 
WHAT TO DO WITH THE PROPERTY IN THIS SHED. ACCORDING TO THE CONTRACT, SIGNED 
BY HUGHES, MOLLERUP MANAGEMENT CAN SELL OR DISPOSE OF THE ITEMS STORED IF NO 
PAYMENT HAS BEEN MADE FOR A CONTINUOUS THIRTY DAY PERIOD. NO PAYMENT HAD 
BEEN MADE FOR THE PAST FOUR MONTHS. ON 3-15-98, MOLLERUP PERSONNEL HAD PLACED 
A SECOND LOCK ON SHED #550, TO PREVENT FURTHER ENTRY UNTIL PAYMENT WAS 
RECEIVED. ON APRIL 7,1998,1 CONTACTED THE MANAGER OF MOLLERUP, LAMAR KEYES, AND 
VERIFIED THAT NO ENTRY HAD BEEN MADE BY EMPLOYEES, AND THAT THE FACILITY'S LOCK 
WAS STILL IN PLACE. THIS AFFIANT REQUESTED THAT MOLLERUP NHT nTSPOSF OF THE 
PROPERTY IN THE SHED IN CASE THE ITEMS ARE STOLEN. 
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Further grounds for issuance of a search warrant are attached hereto and incorporated herein. 
STATEMENTS BY BARRETT INDICATE THERE IS CAUSE TO BELIEVE THE PROPERTY STILL 
INSIDE SHED #550 IS STOLEN. HUGHES WAS VAGUE ABOUT WHICH SHEDS HE HAD 
BURGLARIZED, AND WHAT HE HAD TAKEN FROM EACH SHED, DUE TO THE LARGE NUMBER 
OF SHEDS INVOLVED, AND THE LENGTH OF TIME IN WHICH HE HAD BEEN REMOVING ITEMS. 
OTHER PROPERTY SEIZED FROM THE SHED HAS BEEN VERIFIED AS STOLEN. CONSIDERABLE 
STOLEN PROPERTY HAS NOT BEEN RECOVERED. THERE IS NO OTHER HOUSE OR RESIDENCE 
KNOWN TO YOUR AFFIANT, WHERE HUGHES AND BARRETT WERE STORING STOLEN 
PROPERTY. THERE IS CAUSE TO BELIEVE NO ENTRY HAS BEEN MADE TO THE SHED SINCE 
MARCH 5, 1998. THE PROPERTY WILL BE DISPOSED OF, IF NOT LAWFULLY SEIZED. 
A COPY OF THE RENTAL AGREEMENT, SIGNED BY BARRETT IS ATTACHED. 
This affidavit was reviewed by BRENDA BEATON of the WEBER COUNTY ATTORNEY'S 
OFFICE. 
SWORN TO BEFORE ME this f& dav of 
JUDGE 
IN THE/SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
Search Warrant Affidavit - Page 3 
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2ND DISTRICT COURT 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SEARCH WARRANT 
1 0 ANY PEACE OFFICER IN IMF, S IAIF 01 i ITAH: 
Proof by aflBdavit under oath having been made this day before me by: DONEHOO, I am satisfied that there is 
probable cause to believe that: 
On the premise(s) of: 
5223 S 1900 W, 15, ROY, UT, Tan and brick one story motel room approximately 50ft west of the 
manager's office The entrance door faces south and is white in color. The numbers 15 are on the door., 
In the City of ROY, County of WEBER, State of UTAH, there is now being possessed or concealed certain 
property or evidence described as: 
• METHAMPHETAMINE, a yellowish white powdery substance. 
• • Materials for packaging methamphetamine, specifically small plastic baggies. 
• • Materials for using methamphetamine, including hollow tubes for snorting methamphetamine, 
small spoons for snorting methamphetamine, mirrors for holding methamphetamine while being 
snorted, razor blades for cutting methamphetamine into lines, 
• • Scales for weighing methamphetamine. 
• • Cut, substance used to dilute the methamphetamine. 
• \ II handguns, rifles and other weapons used in conjunction with the sale of controlled substances. 
Which property or evidence: 
• Was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed. 
• Has been used to commit or conceal a public offense. 
• Will be used to commit or conceal a public offense. 
• Is evidence of illegal conduct. 
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1OU ARE THEREFORE COMMANDED 
lii "the daytime. 
To execute without notice of authority or purpose. 
• 
To make a search of the above named or described person(s), premise(s) and vehicle(s) for the herein above 
described person, property or evidence, and if you find the same, or any part thereof, to bring it forthwith 
before me at the, County of WEBER, State of UTAH, or retain such property in your custody subject to the 
order of this court. 
* WORN TO BEFORE ME 
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SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT CUURl 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT 
The undersigned being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
That the A FFIAN I has reasoi i to believe that: 
That on the premise(s) known as: 
5223 SOUTH 1900 WEST , APARTMENT #15, RO\ , U I All: I N 11 IE CIRCLE R MO I EL, #15, A 
WHITE BUILDING, ON THE WEST SIDE OF 1900 WEST. I IN IT # 15 IS APPROXIM VTEI Y 50 FEET 
WEST OF THE MANAGER'S OFFICE, FACING SOUTH 
In the City of ROY, County of WEBER, State of UTAH, there is now certain property or evidence described as: 
HOME STEREO EQUIPMENT, CAR STEREO EQUIPMENT, SPEAKERS, COMPUTERS, 
RADAR DETECTORS, VIDEO GAMES, BOXES O! : STORED GOODS. 
• ITiat said property or evidence: 
• Was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed. 
1
 Is evidence of illegal conduct. 
.-. . hung t he grounds foi issuance of a scarcl i,| van: i: a nt ai c: 
I 
K \FFIANT RECEIVED INFORMATION FROM A CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT THAT 
THERE WAS STOLEN PROPERTY AND DRUGS IN UNIT U15 AT THE CIRCLE R MOTEL. HE 
HAS BEEN TO THE MOTEL IN THE PAST 72 HOIJRS AND HAS AFFIRMED THAT THIS 
PROPERTY IS STILL IN THE ROOM. 
III!!! 
Further grounds for issuance of a search warrant are attached hereto and incorporated herein. 
Your AFFIANT has been a Roy City Police officer for twelve years, and has been a property crimes investigator 
for over one year. In the capacity of detective I have made over one hundred arrests for property crimes. I have 
been trained in criminal investigation techniques during several courses sponsored by the Utah Peace Officers 
Standards and Training. Your AFFIANT has attended, and attained an associate degree in Criminal Justice, 
Law Enforcement emphasis, from Weber State University. 
On 3-2-98, your AFFIANT received a telephone call from Detective Wakefield of Layton P.D he gave me 
information from a confidential informant. He has worked with this informant in the past, and has gained 
information that assisted in the closure of several criminal cases. Wakefield told me that the information the 
informant has provided in the past has been very reliable. 
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On March 5, 1998,1 spoke with Detective Donehoo of the Weber Morgan Narcotics Strike force. 
Donehoo also indicated that this informant had provided reliable information to Detective Tony Garcia as 
well 
ITie informant told me he saw a male known to him as I odd, bnng boxes of propert}' across the fence at 
Mollerup storage sheds, on the southwest corner. Mollerup is located at 1701 West 5300 South, Roy. 
The C.I. said that Todd had a pair of bolt cutters under his coveralls, when he took the boxes to Todd's 
motel room at Circle R. Todd's room was full of computer equipment, stereo equipment, electronics, 
and other property. The informant said that Todd was opening the boxes he brought from Mollerup, and 
seemed surprised at the contents. 
I located footprints in the snow by the southwest corner of Mollerup, that went from inside Mollerup to 
the outside. There were reports of burglaries in these storage sheds over the weekend of February, 28. 
These facts corroborate facts given to me by the informant. 
On March 5, 1998 Detective Donehoo obtained a search warrant for drugs at this location. If upon 
entering the premises to assist Detective Donehoo, there is property located within the premises that 
appears to have been recently removed from storage, specifically boxed, or can be identified as possibly 
stolen from Mollerup, it is requested that this property may also be seized as stolen property. 
SWORN TO BEFORE ME this 
m T H £ S E C 0 N D JUDICIAL; DISTRIC I CO"! IR T, 
• IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY 
• STATE OF UTAH 
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MEMORANDUM 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Two search warrants were issued by the Honorable Stanton M. Taylor on the 5th day of 
March, 1998. An affidavit for search warrant sworn to by Officer Mike Donehoo requested a 
warrant to search for controlled substances. The facts establishing the grounds for the warrant 
were listed as follows: 
Your Affiant, officer Mike Donehoo, is a police officer with Roy City 
Police Department and has been employed as a police officer for over eighteen 
years. I am currently assigned to the Weber Morgan Narcotics Strike Force. 
I graduated from the Utah Police Officer Standard and Training in 1980. I 
received the officer of the year award from Roy City Police Department in 1991. 
I have received hundreds of training hours in narcotics training including training in 
search warrant preparation and execution I have written over fifty search 
warrants and have investigated and supervised over one hundred narcotics cases. 
I have received training and have personal knowledge through my experience in 
the use, sales, and manufacturing of cocaine, crack cocaine, methamphetamine, 
and marijuana, I know what items would most often be found at a premises where 
there are suspects using selling or manufacturing any of these drugs and these 
items are those that I have listed in the description of items to be searched for. 
Within the last 24 hours your Affiant has made a controlled purchase of 
methamphetamine with a confidential informant hereafter referred to as CI #1 from 
David Lafevre in room #15 of the Circle R hotel, 5223 South 1900 West, Roy, 
Utah. CI #1 was searched for contraband, none was found, and fitted with an 
electronic monitoring device. CI #1 was given an amount of money and then was 
followed by Your Affiant to the address of 5223 South 1900 West, room 15, Roy, 
Utah. Your Affiant heard, through the electronic device, a voice asked for an 
amount of money for the methamphetamine. After a few minutes CI #1 left the 
room and met Your Affiant at a pre-designated location. CI #1 turned over a 
small zip-lock baggie of a substance which later tested positive for amphetamine. 
Your Affiant researched OPD records and found that David Lafevre was a suspect 
in a possession of Methamphetamine case handled by OPD officers. 
N v: idn-r• •; :-.-'.\\ las been purchased from the room withiii the last 24 hours. 
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This confidential informant has given their full name and address. This confidential 
informant is volunteering this information and has not been promised anything in 
exchange for this information. This confidential informant has no criminal cases 
pending. This confidential informant is not a suspect in this case. This confidential 
informant is not a suspect in any case at this time. This confidential informant has 
provided information to agents in the past on police matters and the information 
has proven reliable. This confidential informant has been used by agents in the past 
on controlled drug purchases and has proven reliable. 
Another affidavit for search warrant sworn to by Detective Bryson requested a warrant to search 
for property. The facts establishing the grounds for the warrant were listed as follows: 
Your Affiant received information from a confidential informant that there 
was stolen property and drugs in unit #15 at the Circle R Motel, he has been to 
the motel in the past 72 hours and has affirmed that this property is still in the 
room. 
Your Affiant has been a Roy City police officer for twelve years, and has been a 
property crimes investigator for over one year. In the capacity of detective I have 
made over one hundred arrests for property crimes. I have been trained in criminal 
investigation techniques during several courses sponsored by the Utah Peace 
Officers Standards and Training. Your Affiant has attended, and attained an 
associate degree in Criminal Justice, Law Enforcement emphasis, from Weber 
State University. 
On 3-2-98, Your Affiant received a telephone call from Detective Wakefield of 
Layton P.D. He gave me information from a confidential informant. He has 
worked with this informant in the past, and has gained information that assisted in 
the closure of several criminal cases. Wakefield told me that the information the 
informant has provided in the past has been very reliable. 
On March 5, 1998, I spoke with Detective Donehoo of the Weber Morgan 
Narcotics Strike Force. Donehoo also indicated that this informant had provided 
reliable information to Detective Tony Garcia as well. 
The informant told me he saw a male known to him as Todd, bring boxes of 
property across the fence at Mollerup storage sheds, on the southwest corner. 
Mollerup is located at 1701 West 5300 South, Roy. The C.I. said that Todd had a 
pair of bolt cutters under his coveralls, when he took the boxes to Todd's motel 
room at Circle R. Todd's room was full of computer equipment, stereo 
equipment, electronics, and other property. The informant said that Todd was 
opening the boxes he brought from Mollerup, and seemed surprised at the 
contents. 
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I located footprints in the snow by the southwest corner of Mollerup, that went 
from inside Mollerup to the outside. There were reports of burglaries in these 
storage sheds over the weekend of February 28. These facts corroborate facts 
given to my by the informant. 
On March 5, 1998, Detective Donehoo obtained a search warrant for drugs at this 
location. If upon entering the premises to assist Detective Donehoo, there is 
property located within the premises that appears to have been recently removed 
from storage, specifically boxed, or can be identified as possibly stolen from 
Mollerup, it is requested that this property may also be seized as stolen property. 
A ,^ ARGUMENT 
POINT I \ 
THE. AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT ISSUED FOR THE SEARCH FOR 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES DOES NOT ESTABLISH PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THE 
\ 
ISSUANCE OF THE SEARCH WARRANT PURSUANT TO ARTICLE I SECTION 14 OF 
THE CONSTITUTION OF UTAH. 
\ 
The Utah Supreme ^ourt has not adopted the good faith exception as outlined in United 
\ 
V 
States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984), for the requirement that a 
search warrant be issued only upon "the existence of probable cause under Article I Section 14 of 
the Constitution of Utah. (See Sims v. Utah State Tax Commission, 841 P.2d 6 (Utah 1992)). 
However, the Supreme Court has held that Article I Section 14 of the Constitution of Utah may 
be interpreted differently than the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. (See 
State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990)) ; 
The affidavit for the search warrant for controlled substances indicated that a controlled 
buy of drugs was made from a motel room at 5223 South 1900 West, room #15, Roy Utah, from 
David Lafevre. The affidavit does not state whether or not David Lafevre is the registered guest 
in that room, or that he was a registered guest at the time of the sale, nor does it state who the Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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ROY CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT 
CASE REPORT NARRATIVE 
Report I.D: 
Report Date: 
Report Title: 
225672.B3080 
MARCH 6, 1998 
Case Number: 9800881 
Reporting Officer: DETECTIVE BRYSON 
BURGLARY/FORCED/NON-RESIDENCE 
Narrative: 
ON 3-2-98 I RECEIVED A TELEPHONE CALL FROM DETECTIVE DAVE WAKEFIELD 
OF LAYTON P.D. HE TOLD ME THAT HE HAD AN INFORMANT WHO CONTACTED 
HIM REGARDING DRUG AND BURGLARY INFORMATION. WAKEFIELD TOLD ME 
THAT THE C.I. HAD GIVEN HIM INFORMATION IN THE PAST ON SEVERAL 
OCCASIONS, AND THE C.I. WAS A VERY RELIABLE INFORMANT. WAKEFIELD 
GAVE ME THE NAME AND TELEPHONE NUMBER OF THE C.I. 
ON 3-2-98 I CONTACTED THE C.I. HE TOLD ME THE FOLLOWING. ON FRIDAY, 2-
27-98 HE WENT TO THE CIRCLE R MOTEL IN ROY, ROOM #15. WHEN HE 
ARRIVED, HE MET A MAN NAMED TODD, AND HIS GIRLFRIEND PAM, THAT WERE 
STAYING IN THIS ROOM. THE C.I. DID NOT LEARN THEIR LAST NAMES. WHEN 
HE FIRST ARRIVED, HE SAW TODD WALKING TOWARDS HIS ROOM FROM THE 
AREA TO THE EAST. TODD ASKED THE C.I. IF HE WOULD GO TO THE ALLEY 
BEHIND HARMON'S GROCERY STORE TO PICK UP PAM. THEY DROVE BEHIND 
HARMON'S, AND PAM WAS THERE. SHE HAD BOXES OF PROPERTY WITH HER. 
THEY PUT THE PROPERTY IN THE C.I.'S TRUCK, AND DROVE BACK TO THE 
MOTEL. 
WHEN THEY GOT INSIDE THE MOTEL, TODD UNZIPPED HIS COVERALLS, AND 
REMOVED A PAIR OF BOLT CUTTERS FROM INSIDE THE COVERALLS. TODD 
TOLD THE C.I. THAT HE WORKS AT MOLLERUP, THE STORAGE UNITS TO THE 
EAST OF (BEHIND) HARMON'S. TODD SAID THAT HE ALSO HAD A STORAGE 
SHED THAT HE RENTED AT MOLLERUP. TODD SAID HE NEEDED TO GET THE 
PROPERTY FROM HIS SHED, BECAUSE HE WAS GOING TO SELL IT. TODD THEN 
ASKED THE C.I. IF HE WOULD GIVE HIM ANOTHER RIDE WITH SOME PROPERTY. 
THE C.I. AGREED TO DO SO. HE MET TODD A SHORT TIME LATER BEHIND 
TANDY LEATHER (ON THE SOUTHWEST CORNER OF MOLLERUP.) THE C.I. SAW 
TODD CLIMB THE SECURITY FENCE, AT THE GATE, AND PULL BOXES OF 
PROPERTY THROUGH THE GATE. THERE WAS ONE BOX THEY COULD NOT FIT 
THROUGH THE OPENING OF THE GATE, AND LEFT IT THERE. 
THE C.I. TOOK TODD BACK TO CIRCLE R. INSIDE, HE WATCHED TODD AND PAM 
OPENING THE BOXES. THEY COMMENTED ON WHAT THEY FOUND IN THE 
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BOXES, AND THE CI. TOLD ME THAT BASED ON THE WAY TODD AND PAM WERE 
ACTING, THE PROPERTY COULDN'T HAVE BEEN THEIRS, BECAUSE THEY DIDN'T 
KNOW WHAT IT WAS UNTIL THE BOXES WERE OPENED. 
WHILE INSIDE THE ROOM, THE CI. OBSERVED SEVERAL ITEMS OF PROPERTY. 
HE DESCRIBED THEM TO ME. HE SAID THERE WAS CAR STEREO EQUIPMENT, 
SPEAKERS, HOME STEREO EQUIPMENT, COMPUTERS, ALL KINDS OF TOOLS, A 
COMPOUND BOW, A RADIO CONTROLLED CAR, RADAR DETECTORS, PELLET 
GUNS, AND PISTOL HOLSTERS WITHOUT PISTOLS IN THEM. HE ALSO SAW A 
PROPANE CAN THAT APPEARED TO BE CONVERTED TO A TORCH, AND A GLASS 
TUBE. THE CI. SAID THAT THESE ITEMS ARE SOMETIMES USED TO INGEST 
METHAMPHETAMINE. HE SUSPECTED AT THE TIME HE WAS AT CIRCLE R, THAT 
TODD AND PAM WERE UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF METH. 
THE CI. TOLD ME THAT IT SEEMED UNUSUAL TO HIM THAT ALL THESE ITEMS 
WERE KEPT IN TODD'S MOTEL ROOM, INSTEAD OF HIS STORAGE SHED, IF THE 
PROPERTY WAS NOT STOLEN. WHEN THE C.I. LEFT CIRCLE R, TODD GAVE HIM A 
SEGA GAME. TODD TOLD THE CI. IT WAS IN EXCHANGE FOR THE 
TRANSPORTATION THAT THE CI. PROVIDED TO TODD. 
DURING THE WEEKEND FOLLOWING 2-27-98, TODD CALLED THE C.I.'S HOME 
SEVERAL TIMES. THE C.I. DID NOT TAKE THE CALLS. AFTER HE TOLD ME THIS 
INFORMATION, I ASKED THE CI. TO TALK TO TODD IF HE CALLED AGAIN. I 
TOLD HIM TO SEE WHAT HE COULD FIND OUT FROM TODD, WITHOUT 
COMMITTING TO ANYTHING. I TOLD HIM TO JUST TALK TO HIM, AND TELL HIM 
HE WOULD THINK IT OVER, THEN REPORT BACK TO ME. 
ON 3-2-98 THE CI. LEFT A MESSAGE FOR ME THAT I DID NOT RECEIVE UNTIL 3-
3-3-98. WHEN I SPOKE TO THE CI. ON 3-3-98, HE TOLD ME THAT TODD HAD 
CALLED HIM THE DAY PRIOR. TODD ASKED THE C.I. IF HE WOULD HELP HIM 
MOVE A WASHER AND DRYER SET, AND A DRESSER, AND OTHER PROPERTY. 
TODD DID NOT HAVE A VEHICLE, AND WANTED TO MOVE SOME OF THE 
PROPERTY TO LAYTON, AND SOME TO OGDEN. TODD SAID THAT IF THE CI. 
WOULD HELP, HE WOULD GIVE HIM DRUGS. TODD ALSO OFFERED TO TRADE 
PROPERTY FOR CASH OR DRUGS. THE CI. TOLD TODD HE WOULD THINK IT 
OVER AND GET BACK TO HIM. 
AFTER I SPOKE WITH THE CI. I ATTEMPTED TO VERIFY WHAT HE TOLD ME. I 
WENT TO THE CIRCLE R, AND FOUND THE ROOM WAS RENTED TO A DAVID 
MARK LEFEVRE, NOT TO A TODD. I ALSO OBTAINED AN EMPLOYEE LIST FROM 
MOLLERUP, AND THERE WAS NO DAVID LEFEVRE OR SOMEONE WITH THE FIRST 
NAME TODD, THAT WAS AN EMPLOYEE THERE. AS I WAS UNABLE TO FURTHER 
VERIFY THAT INFORMATION, I COULD NOT SEEK A WARRANT TO SEARCH THE 
ROOM. 
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ON 3-5-98 I CONTACTED MIKE DONEHOO AT THE WEBER MORGAN NARCOTICS 
STRIKE FORCE. I TOLD HIM THE INFORMATION I HAD ABOUT TODD AND PAM, 
AND OF THE C.I. DONEHOO CHECKED HIS FILES, AND FOUND THAT THIS C.I. 
HAD ASSISTED AGENT TONY GARCIA IN THE PAST. THIS HAD LED TO A 
SUCCESSFUL PROSECUTION WHEN THE C.I. WORKED WITH GARCIA. 
DONEHOO CONTACTED THE C.I. HE ASKED HIM IF HE THOUGHT TODD AND 
PAM MIGHT SELL HIM DRUGS, AND IF HE WOULD MAKE A BUY. THE C.I. AGREED 
TO TRY. TODD WAS CONTACTED, AND AGREED TO SELL THE C.I. A QUANTITY OF 
DRUGS. DONEHOO ARRANGED TO MEET THE C.I. AND THE BUY WAS MADE. 
DETECTIVE DONEHOO AND I THEN WROTE SEARCH WARRANTS FOR THE ROOM 
15 AT THE CIRCLE R. HIS WARRANT WAS BASED ON THE PROBABLE CAUSE OF 
DRUGS BEING IN THE ROOM, AND MINE WAS RELATED TO PROPERTY. WHEN 
DOING THE BUY, THE C.I. SAW THAT MUCH OF THE PROPERTY THAT HAD BEEN 
THERE THE FRIDAY PRIOR, WAS STILL PRESENT. BOTH OF THE SEARCH 
WARRANTS WERE SIGNED BY JUDGE STANTON TAYLOR. 
AT 1630 DETECTIVE DONEHOO, I AND SEVERAL AGENTS OF THE STRIKE FORCE 
WENT TO THE CIRCLE R TO SERVE THE WARRANTS. WE OBTAINED A ROOM KEY 
FROM THE MANAGER. WHEN WE ENTERED THE ROOM, NO ONE WAS THERE. 
THE SEARCH WAS BEGUN. METH WAS FOUND IN THE ROOM. WITHIN THE NEXT 
FEW MINUTES, JEFFREY TODD HUGHES ENTERED THE ROOM. HE WAS PLACED 
UNDER ARREST, AND SEARCHED. THERE WAS PARAPHERNALIA WITH RESIDUE 
FOUND ON HIS PERSON. HE SAID THAT HE LIVED AT THE MOTEL WITH HIS 
GIRLFRIEND PAM BARRETT. HE SAID HIS FRIEND DAVID LEFEVRE OFTEN VISITS 
THERE, AND THAT PAM AND DAVE WERE PRESENTLY TOGETHER IN LAYTON, 
AND WERE DUE BACK AT ANY TIME. TODD SAID THAT ALTHOUGH DAVID VISITS 
A LOT, HE LIVES IN LAYTON WITH HIS WIFE. 
DONEHOO AND THE STRIKE FORCE AGENTS STAYED AT CIRCLE R TO CONTINUE 
THEIR SEARCH, AND WAIT FOR PAM AND DAVID. I TRANSPORTED TODD TO 
ROY P.D. TO INTERVIEW HIM. 
AT THE OFFICE, I READ TODD MIRANDA. I READ IT TO HIM VERBATIM, FROM A 
PRINTED COPY. TODD TOLD ME HE UNDERSTOOD HIS RIGHTS, AND AGREED TO 
TALK WITH ME. I TOLD TODD THAT THERE HAD BEEN SOME ITEMS MISSING 
FROM MOLLERUP, AND THAT I HAD SEEN SOME OF THEM IN HIS MOTEL ROOM. 
I EXPLAINED THAT I HAD A WARRANT TO SEARCH HIS ROOM, AND THAT I 
NUMEROUS REPORTS OF BURGLARY AT MOLLERUP. TODD TOLD ME THAT HE 
HAD TAKEN SOME ITEMS FROM SHEDS, BUT THAT HE HAD NOT CUT ANY LOCKS 
TO DO SO. HE SAID THAT HE LOOKED FOR SHEDS WITHOUT A LOCK ON IT, OR 
A CUT LOCK ON IT, THEN HE WOULD OPEN THE SHED AND LOOK INSIDE. HE 
TOOK WHATEVER HE COULD FIND IN THE SHED. AT FIRST TODD SAID HE ONLY 
TOOK WHAT OTHERS WOULD NOT HAVE WANTED OR PROBABLY WOULD HAVE 
THROWN AWAY. AS WE DISCUSSED THE PROPERTY FURTHER, TODD SAID THAT 
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SOME OF THE THINGS HE TOOK, HE KNEW THE OWNER WOULD NOT HAVE 
GIVEN UP VOLUNTARILY. HE ADMITTED THAT HE TOOK SEVERAL THINGS HE 
SHOULD NOT HAVE. HE TOLD ME THAT SOME OF THESE THINGS WERE IN HIS 
MOTEL ROOM, AND SOME OF THEM WERE IN HIS STORAGE SHED AT MOLLERUP, 
#550. I ASKED TODD IF HE WOULD GO TO MOLLERUP WITH ME, AND SHOW ME 
THESE THINGS, AND POINT OUT SPECIFIC STORAGE SHEDS HE HAD REMOVED 
PROPERTY FROM. TODD AGREED TO DO THIS. SGT. WHINHAM ACCOMPANIED 
ME AND TODD TO MOLLERUP. 
TODD SHOWED US THE FOLLOWING SHEDS. HE SAID FROM SHED #721 HE 
REMOVED A SONY VCR (WE RECOVERED A SONY CD PLAYER FROM THE 
BACKPACK HE WAS CARRYING WHEN HE WALKED INTO HIS MOTEL ROOM, THAT 
HE TOLD US WAS A VCR.) HE SAID HE ALSO TOOK SOME DISHES AND A LARGE 
TOOL BOX MARKED "TOPPER" FROM THIS SHED (OR POSSIBLY THE ONE NEXT 
TO IT.) FROM SHED #697 HE TOOK A BOX OF CHRISTMAS DECORATIONS, AND 
SOME OTHER ITEMS AS WELL. FROM #75 HE TOOK SOME SPEAKERS AND AN 
AMPLIFIER THAT WERE NOW IN HIS MOTEL ROOM. HE TOOK A LARGE NUMBER 
OF BASEBALL CARDS FROM THE AREA OF SHEDS 664, 665, OR 631. HE TOOK A 
CAMPING TENT FROM A UNIT HE THOUGHT MIGHT HAVE BEEN #77. FROM 
STORAGE SHED #109 HE TOOK SOME GREEN INDOOR-OUTDOOR CARPET. 
FROM UNIT #577 A WOODEN KITCHEN CHAIR. FROM 576, 577, OR 578, HE 
TOOK A DISHWASHER. FROM 442 HE TOOK SOME DISHES, AND CHRISTMAS 
DECORATIONS. FROM UNIT #424 HE TOOK TWO MASONRY LEVELS, AND LATER 
PAWNED THEM AT CASH AMERICA IN RTVERDALE. HE SAID HE HAD PAWNED A 
COMPOUND BOW AT CASH AMERICA THAT HE HAD STOLEN. HE HAD JUST 
PAWNED THE BOW TODAY. TODD SAID 
THE BOW AND SOME STEREO SPEAKERS WERE IN SHED #75 WHEN HE TOOK 
THEM. TODD TOOK A LANTERN AND A SKILL SAW FROM A SHED, BUT HE 
COULDNT REMEMBER WHICH ONE, HE THOUGHT IT WAS BETWEEN #85 AND 
#123. HE SAID HE REMEMBERED THEM SPECIFICALLY BECAUSE THEY WERE 
THE ONLY TWO THINGS IN THE SHED. HE ALSO TOOK A STEREO AND A RADIO 
CONTROLLED CAR FROM SHED #103. TODD TOLD ME THAT SOME OF THESE 
ITEMS WERE STILL IN HIS SHED. TODD SAID THAT INITIALLY IT WAS PAM THAT 
STARTED COLLECTING ITEMS FROM OTHER SHEDS. HE SAID THAT LATER ON, 
HE WOULD SOMETIMES GO WITH HER, AND SOMETIMES GO ALONE TO TAKE 
THINGS FROM SHEDS. 
I TOLD TODD THAT THE SEARCH WARRANT I HAD WAS TO HIS MOTEL ROOM, 
AND DID NOT INCLUDE MOLLERUP. I ASKED IF HE WOULD GIVE HIS CONSENT 
TO SEARCH HIS SHED. TODD AGREED TO THIS. I ASKED HIM TO GIVE WRITTEN 
CONSENT TO ALLOW US TO SEARCH, AND TO "SEIZE ANY ITEMS AS DIRECTED 
BY ME." TODD SIGNED HIS CONSENT, A COPY OF WHICH IS ATTACHED TO THE 
REPORT. TODD THEN OPENED THE SHED. HE REMOVED NUMEROUS ITEMS. 
EACH ITEM HE EITHER DIRECTED TO A STACK OF HIS PERSONAL ITEMS, OR TO 
A STACK OF ITEMS THAT WE WERE TO SEIZE. WE DID NOT TAKE ANY ITEM 
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THAT TODD DID NOT SPECIFICALLY TELL US TO. WE PHOTOGRAPHED THE 
SHED BEFORE ITEMS WERE REMOVED, AND AGAIN WHEN IT WAS PARTIALLY 
EMPTIED. THE INDIVIDUAL ITEMS TAKEN AS RECOVERED STOLEN PROPERTY 
WERE PHOTOGRAPHED AS WELL. 
WHILE TODD, SGT. WHINHAM AND I WERE AT MOLLERUP, PAM AND DAVID 
RETURNED TO CIRCLE R. THEY WERE TAKEN INTO CUSTODY BY DETECTIVE 
DONEHOO. SGT. WHINHAM TRANSPORTED PAM BARRETT TO ROY P.D. WHERE 
HE INTERVIEWED HER. SEE HIS ATTACHED SUPPLEMENT, AND PAM'S WRITTEN 
STATEMENT FOR DETAILS. 
WHEN TODD FINISHED REMOVING THE STOLEN ITEMS FROM HIS SHED, I LEFT 
THE ITEMS WITH OFFICER WEEKS, AND OTHER OFFICERS, TO PROCESS. I TOOK 
TODD BACK TO ROY P.D. THERE I LOOKED THROUGH MY CASE FILES FROM 
MOLLERUP. I FOUND FOUR CASES THAT CONTAINED PROPERTY THAT HAD 
BEEN IN THE POSSESSION OF TODD, AND HE HAD ADMITTED TO BEING 
INVOLVED IN. THESE FOUR CASES WERE #9800954, 9800881, 9800645, AND 
9800309. TODD AND PAM WERE THEN BOOKED INTO WEBER COUNTY JAIL ON 
FOUR COUNTS OF THIRD DEGREE BURGLARY, RELATED TO THESE FOUR CASES, 
AND THE DRUG CHARGES THAT DETECTIVE DONEHOO WILL REPORT ON. 
I THEN RETURNED TO THE CIRCLE R MOTEL. THE ROOM WAS SEARCHED FOR 
PROPERTY THAT WAS DESCRIBED IN THE SEARCH WARRANT. THERE WERE 
TWO HUNDRED AND TWENTY SIX ITEMS THAT WERE INVENTORIED, MARKED AS 
EVIDENCE AND TRANSPORTED TO ROY P.D. A COPY OF THE WARRANT WAS 
GIVEN TO TODD, AND A COPY WAS LEFT ON THE DRESSER IN THE MOTEL 
ROOM. THERE WAS ALSO AN INVENTORY OF ALL ITEMS SEIZED LEFT WITH THE 
COPY OF THE WARRANT. THESE WERE WITH THE WARRANT AND INVENTORY 
LEFT BY DETECTIVE DONEHOO. 
I RETURNED THE ROOM KEY TO THE MANAGER, AND WENT BACK TO COMPLETE 
PAPERWORK. DUE TO THE FACT THAT TODD AND PAM WERE BOOKED ON FOUR 
COUNTS OF BURGLARY EACH, THIS REPORT WAS COMPLETED. HOWEVER 
THERE WILL BE CONSIDERABLE FOLLOW UP DONE IN MATCHING PROPERTY TO 
VICTIMS, AND VERIFYING INFORMATION THAT TODD AND PAM PROVIDED. 
FOLLOW UP REPORTS, AND CONSULTATION WITH THE COUNTY ATTORNEY'S 
OFFICE CONCERNING ADDITIONAL CHARGES WILL FOLLOW. 
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SECOND DISTRICT COURT - OGDEN COURT 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JEFFERY TODD HUGHES, 
Defendant. 
MINUTES 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 981901023 FS 
Judge: ROGER S. DUTSON 
Date: June 23, 1998 
PRESENT 
Clerk: debbiew 
Reporter: -
Prosecutor: BRENDA BEATON 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): PDA, GRAVIS 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: December 3, 1966 
Video 
Tape Number: D623 Tape Count: 11:00 
CHARGES 
1 BURGLARY - 3rd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 05/05/1998 Guilty Plea 
3. BURGLARY - 3rd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 05/05/1998 Guilty Plea 
4. THEFT - 3rd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 05/05/1998 Guilty Plea 
5. BURGLARY - 3rd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 05/05/1998 Guilty Plea 
6. THEFT - 3rd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 05/05/1998 Guilty Plea 
7. BURGLARY - 3rd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 05/05/1998 Guilty Plea 
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Case No: 981901023 
Date: Jun 23, 1998 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of BURGLARY a 3rd Degree 
Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not 
to exceed five years in the Utah State Prison. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of BURGLARY a 3rd Degree 
Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not 
to exceed five years in the Utah State Prison. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of THEFT a 3rd Degree Felony, 
the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not to 
exceed five years in the Utah State Prison. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of BURGLARY a 3rd Degree 
Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not 
to exceed five years in the Utah State Prison. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of THEFT a 3rd Degree Felony, 
the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not to 
exceed five years in the Utah State Prison. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of BURGLARY a 3rd Degree 
Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not 
to exceed five years in the Utah State Prison. 
To the WEBER County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your 
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the 
defendant will be confined. 
SENTENCE RECOMMENDATION NOTE 
The court recommends a concurrent sentence with each count and 
concurrent with case 981901022 FS. 
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Case No: 
Date: 
981901023 
Jun 23, 1998 
Dated this 7 ^ day of .i^P 
C&eeyi^ 
ROGER SI DUTSON 
District Court Judge 
ns 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
SECOND DISTRICT COURT - OGDEN COURT 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JEFFERY TODD HUGHES, 
Defendant 
MINUTES 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 981901022 FS 
Judge: ROGER S. DUTSON 
Date: June 23, 1998 
PRESENT 
Clerk: debbiew 
Prosecutor: BRENDA BEATON 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): PDA, GRAVIS 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: December 3, 1966 
Video 
Tape Number: D62 3 Tape Count: 11:00 
CHARGES 
1. ILLEGAL POSS/USE OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE - 2nd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 05/05/1998 Guilty Plea 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of ILLEGAL POSS/USE OF 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE a 2nd Degree Felony, the defendant is 
sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less than one year nor 
more than fifteen years in the Utah State Prison. 
To the WEBER County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your 
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the 
defendant will be confined. 
SENTENCE RECOMMENDATION NOTE 
The court recommends credit for time served and orders the 
defendant to pay full restitution to be determined on 8/25/98 @ 
9:00 a.m. Court further orders the defendant to pay $500 public 
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Case No: 981901022 
Date: Jun 23, 1998 
defender fees 
lis J^y Dated th day of S ^ z ^ ^ t ^ , 1 
ROGER S/ DUTSON 
District Court Judge 
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ADDENDUM #6 
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SECOND DISTRICT COURT - OGDEN COURT 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
PAM KAY BARRETT, 
Defendant. 
MINUTES 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
NOTICE 
Case No: 981901020 FS 
Judge: ROGER S. DUTSON 
Date: June 23, 1998 
PRESENT 
Clerk: dianew 
Prosecutor: BRENDA J. BEATON 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): MARTIN GRAVIS (PDA) 
Agency: Adult Probation and Parole 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: November 2, 1953 
Video 
Tape Number: DO623 Tape Count: 1045 
CHARGES 
1. ILLEGAL POSS/USE OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE - 2nd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 05/05/1998 Guilty Plea 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of ILLEGAL POSS/USE OF 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE a 2nd Degree Felony, the defendant is 
sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less than one year nor 
more than fifteen years in the Utah State Prison. 
The prison term is suspended. 
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Case No: 981901020 
Date: Jun 23, 1998 
SENTENCE JAIL 
Based on the defendants conviction of ILLEGAL POSS/USE OF 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE a 2nd Degree Felony, the defendant is 
sentenced to a term of 3 65 day(s) 
SENTENCE JAIL SERVICE NOTE 
Matter to be reviewed in 60 days to enable the defendant to locate 
an in-patient treatment program. 
ORDER OF PROBATION 
The defendant is placed on probation for 3 6 month(s). 
Probation is to be supervised by Adult Probation and Parole. 
Defendant to serve 365 day(s) jail. 
PROBATION CONDITIONS 
The defendant shall enter into an agreement with the Utah State 
Department of Adult Probation and Parole and comply strictly with 
its terms and conditions. 
The defendant shall violate no law: federal, state or municipal. 
The defendant shall report to the Department of Corrections and to 
the court whenever required. 
The defendant shall refrain from the use of alcohol or illegal 
drugs. 
The defendant shall submit to search, seizure and chemical testing. 
The defendant shall not frequent establishments where alcohol is 
the chief menu item nor associate with persons using alcohol or 
illegal drugs. 
The defendant shall maintain full-time, verifiable employment. 
The defendant shall complete 40 hours of community service through 
the direction of Adult Probation and Parole. 
The defendant shall have no contact with Jeff Hughes during the 
probation period. 
The defendant shall pay full restitution jointly/severally with the 
co-defendant to be determined on August 25, 1998 at 9:00 a.m. 
The defendant shall be on Intensive Drug Supervision with Adult 
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Case No: 981901020 
Date: Jun 23, 1998 
Probation and Parole. 
The defendant shall complete and in-patient program for substance 
abuse treatment upon release from jail, paying all costs. 
REVIEW FOR PLACEMENT is scheduled. 
Date: 08/25/1998 
Time: 09:00 a.m. 
Location: 3rd Floor Northwest 
Second District Court 
2525 Grant Avenue 
Ogden, UT 84401 
Dated this 7 ^ day of 
DtTTSON 
Court Judge 
In compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act, individuals 
needing special accommodations (including auxiliary communicative 
aids and services) during this proceeding should call Venna 
Woodring at (801)395-1062 at least three working days prior to the 
proceeding. The general information phone number is (801)395-1071. 
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SECOND DISTRICT COURT - OGDEN COURT 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
PAM KAY BARRETT, 
Defendant 
MINUTES 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
NOTICE 
Case No: 981901021 FS 
Judge: ROGER S. DUTSON 
Date: June 23, 1998 
;Sfd3 
PRESENT 
Clerk: debbiew 
Reporter: -
Prosecutor: BRENDA BEATON 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): PDA, GRAVIS 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: November 2, 1953 
Video 
Tape Number: D62 3 Tape Count: 10:45 
CHARGES 
1. BURGLARY - 3rd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 05/05/1998 Guilty Plea 
3. BURGLARY - 3rd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 05/05/1998 Guilty Plea 
4. THEFT - 3rd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 05/05/1998 Guilty Plea 
5. BURGLARY - 3rd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 05/05/1998 Guilty Plea 
6. THEFT - 3rd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 05/05/1998 Guilty Plea 
7. BURGLARY - 3rd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 05/05/1998 Guilty Plea 
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Case No: 981901021 
Date: Jun 23, 1998 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of BURGLARY a 3rd Degree 
Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not 
to exceed five years in the Utah State Prison. 
The prison term is suspended. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of BURGLARY a 3rd Degree 
Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not 
to exceed five years in the Utah State Prison. 
The prison term is suspended. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of THEFT a 3rd Degree Felony, 
the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not to 
exceed five years in the Utah State Prison. 
The prison term is suspended. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of BURGLARY a 3rd Degree 
Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not 
to exceed five years in the Utah State Prison. 
The prison term is suspended. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of THEFT a 3rd Degree Felony, 
the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not to 
exceed five years in the Utah State Prison. 
The prison term is suspended. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of BURGLARY a 3rd Degree 
Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not 
to exceed five years in the Utah State Prison. 
The prison term is suspended. 
SENTENCE JAIL 
Based on the defendant's conviction of BURGLARY a 3rd Degree 
Felony, the defendant is sentenced to a term of 365 day(s) 
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Case No: 981901021 
Date: Jun 23, 1998 
SENTENCE TRUST 
The defendant is to pay the following: 
Attorney Fees: Amount: $500.00 
ORDER OF PROBATION 
The defendant is placed on probation for 3 year(s). 
Probation is to be supervised by Adult Probation and Parole. 
PROBATION CONDITIONS 
The defendant shall enter into an agreement with the Utah State 
Department of Adult Probation and Parole and comply strictly with 
its terms and conditions. 
The defendant shall violate no law: federal, state or municipal. 
The defendant shall report to the Department of Corrections and to 
the court whenever required. 
The defendant shall refrain from the use of alcohol or illegal 
drugs. 
The defendant shall submit to search, seizure and chemical testing. 
The defendant shall not frequent establishments where alcohol is 
the chief menu item nor associate with persons using alcohol or 
illegal drugs. 
The defendant shall maintain full-time, verifiable employment. 
The defendant shall complete 4 0 hours of community service through 
the direcction of Adult Probation & Parole. 
The defendant shall pay $500 public defender fees through the Adult 
Probation & Parole. 
The defendant shall have no contact with Jeff Hughes during the 
probation period. 
The defendant shall pay full restitution jointly/severally with the 
co-defendant to be determined on 8/25/98 @ 9:00 a.m. 
The defendant shall serve 365 days jail with a review in 60 days to 
enable the defendant to locate an in-patient treatment program. 
v J .j 
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Case No: 981901021 
Date: Jun 23, 1998 
The defendant shall be on Intensive Drug Supervision with Adult 
Probation & Parole. 
The defendant shall complete an in-patient program for substance 
abuse treatment upon a release from jail, paying all costs. 
REVIEW FOR PLACEMENT is 
Date: 08/25/1998 
Time: 09:00 a.m. 
Location 
scheduled. 
3rd Floor Northwest 
Second District Court 
2 52 5 Grant Avenue 
Ogden, UT 84401 
Dated this u day of <^L^ 
?OGER S/ DUTSOI 
District Court Judge 
In compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act, individuals 
needing special accommodations (including auxiliary communicative 
aids and services) during this proceeding should call Venna 
Woodring at (801)395-1062 at least three working days prior to the 
proceeding. The general information phone number is (801)395-1071. 
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OCCUPATIONS AND PROFESSIONS 58-37-8 
u 
&.. 
5 h i b i t e d ac t s — P e n a l t i e s . 
iited acts A — Penalties: 
-p t as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful 
person to knowingly and intentionally: 
i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess 
h* intent to produce, manufacture, or dispense, a 
oiled or counterfeit substance; 
distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, 
jo agree, consent, offer, or arrange to distribute a 
- to l led or counterfeit substance; 
_ i ) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance 
l ih intent to distribute; or 
tGv) engage in a continuing criminal enterprise 
-e: 
*" (A) the person participates, directs, or engages 
fJin conduct which results in any violation of any 
^provision of Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, 
r 37d that is a felony; and 
(B) the violation is a part of a continuing 
series of two or more violations of Title 58, 
^ C h a p t e r s 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d on separate 
.occasions that are undertaken in concert with 
five or more persons with respect to whom the 
V person occupies a position of organizer, supervi-
sor, or any other position of management. 
) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (l)(a) 
respect to: 
(i) a substance classified in Schedule I or II or a 
^controlled substance analog is guilty of a second 
^degree felony and upon a second or subsequent con-
eviction is guilty of a first degree felony; 
•(ii) a substance classified in Schedule III or IV, or 
^marijuana, is guilty of a third degree felony, and upon 
f a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of a second 
^degree felony; or 
.£.(iii) a substance classified in Schedule V is guilty of 
. a class A misdemeanor and upon a second or subse-
tquent conviction is guilty of a third degree felony. 
Any person convicted of violating Subsection 
Xiv) is guilty of a first degree felony punishable by 
onment for an indeterminate term of not less than 
years and which may be for life. Imposition or 
ution of the sentence may not be suspended, and the 
^person is not eligible for probation. 
•^Prohibited acts B — Penalties: 
a) I t is unlawful: 
-(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to 
^possess or use a controlled substance, unless it was 
k obtained under a valid prescription or order, directly 
om a practitioner while acting in the course of his 
^-professional practice, or as otherwise authorized by 
*4his subsection; 
SMii) for any owner, tenant, licensee, or person in 
^control of any building, room, tenement, vehicle, boat, 
^aircraft, or other place knowingly and intentionally to 
K
 P ennit them to be occupied by persons unlawfully 
j possessing, using, or distributing controlled sub-
* j r
8 t a n c es in any of those locations; or 
**--(ni) for any person knowingly and intentionally to 
^possess an altered or forged prescription or written 
"ftrt e r f ° r a c o n t r o l l e d substance. 
*y
 v A n y P e r s on convicted of violating Subsection 
JWO) with respect to: 
>
m a r i juana , if the amount is 100 pounds or more, 
^18 guilty of a second degree felony; 
{.. * u ' a substance classified in Schedule I or II, mari-
- * v a n a ' * ^ n e amount is more than 16 ounces, but less 
«ian 100 pounds, or a controlled substance analog, is 
i
 t guilty of a third degree felony; or 
(hi) marijuana, if the marijuana is not in the form 
of an extracted resin from any part of the plant, and 
the amount is more than one ounce but less than 16 
ounces, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
(c) Any person convicted of violating Subsection 
(2)(a)(i) while inside the exterior boundaries of property 
occupied by any correctional facility as defined in Section 
64-13-1 or any public jail or other place of confinement 
shall be sentenced to a penalty one degree greater than 
provided in Subsection (2Kb). 
(d) Upon a second or subsequent conviction of posses-
sion of any controlled substance by a person, that person 
shall be sentenced to a one degree greater penalty than 
provided in this subsection. 
(e) Any person who violates Subsection (2)(a)(i) with 
respect to all other controlled substances not included in 
Subsection (2)(b)(i), (ii), or (iii), including less than one 
ounce of marijuana, is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. 
Upon a second conviction the person is guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor, and upon a third or subsequent conviction 
the person is guilty of a third degree felony. 
(f) Any person convicted of violating Subsection 
(2)(a)(ii) or (2)(a)(iii) is: 
(i) on a first conviction, guilty of a class B misde-
meanor; 
(ii) on a second conviction, guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor; and 
(iii) on a third or subsequent conviction, guilty of a 
third degree felony. 
(3) Prohibited acts C — Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful for any person knowingly and inten-
tionally: 
(i) to use in the course of the manufacture or 
distribution of a controlled substance a license num-
ber which is fictitious, revoked, suspended, or issued 
to another person or, for the purpose of obtaining a 
controlled substance, to assume the title of, or repre-
sent himself to be, a manufacturer, wholesaler, apoth-
ecary, physician, dentist, veterinarian, or other au-
thorized person; 
(ii) to acquire or obtain possession of, to procure or 
attempt to procure the administration of, to obtain a 
prescription for, to prescribe or dispense to any per-
son known to be attempting to acquire or obtain 
possession of, or to procure the administration of any 
controlled substance by misrepresentation or failure 
by the person to disclose his receiving any controlled 
substance from another source, fraud, forgery, decep-
tion, subterfuge, alteration of a prescription or writ-
ten order for a controlled substance, or the use of a 
false name or address; 
(iii) to make any false or forged prescription or 
written order for a controlled substance, or to utter 
the same, or to alter any prescription or written order 
issued or written under the terms of this chapter; or 
(iv) to make, distribute, or possess any punch, die, 
plate, stone, or other thing designed to print, imprint. 
or reproduce the trademark, trade name, or other 
identifying mark, imprint, or device of another or any 
likeness of any of the foregoing upon any drug or 
container or labeling so as to render any drug a 
counterfeit controlled substance. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (3)(a) 
is guilty of a third degree felony. 
(4) Prohibited acts D — Penalties: 
(a) Notwithstanding other provisions of this section, a 
person not authorized under this chapter who commits 
any act declared to be unlawful under this section, Title 
58, Chapter 37a, Utah Drug Paraphernalia Act, or under 
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(1) "Building," in addition to its ordinary meaning, 
means any watercraft, aircraft, trailer, sleeping car, or 
other structure or vehicle adapted for overnight accom-
modation of persons or for carrying on business therein 
and includes: 
(a) each separately secured or occupied portion of 
the structure or vehicle; and 
(b) each structure appur tenant to or connected 
with the structure or vehicle. 
(2) "Dwelling" means a building which is usually occu-
pied by a person lodging therein at night, whether or not 
a person is actually present. 
(3) A person "enters or remains unlawfully" in or upon 
premises when the premises or any portion thereof at the 
time of the entry or remaining are not open to the public 
and when the actor is not otherwise licensed or privileged 
to enter or remain on the premises or such portion 
thereof. 
(4) "Enter" means: 
(a) intrusion of any part of the body; or 
(b) intrusion of any physical object under control of 
the actor. 1973 
-202. Burglary. 
) A person is guilty of burglary if he enters or remains 
.wfully in a building or any portion of a building with 
i t to commit a felony or theft or commit an assault on any 
on. 
) Burglary is a felony of the third degree unless it was 
nitted in a dwelling, in which event it is a felony of the 
nd degree. 1973 
-203. Aggravated burglary. 
I A person is guilty of aggravated burglary if in attempt-
committing, or fleeing from a burglary the actor or 
her participant in the crime: 
(a) causes bodily injury to any person who is not a 
participant in the crime; 
(b) uses or threatens the immediate use of a dangerous 
weapon against any person who is not a participant in the 
:rime; or 
(c) possesses or at tempts to use any explosive or dan-
gerous weapon. 
Aggravated burglary is a first degree felony. 
As used in this section, "dangerous weapon" has the 
» definition as under Section 76-1-601. 1989 
•204. Burglary of a vehic le — Charge of o ther 
offense. 
Any person who unlawfully enters any vehicle with 
Lt to commit a felony or theft is guilty of a burglary of a 
:le. 
Burglary of a vehicle is a class A misdemeanor. 
A charge against any person for a violation of Subsection 
lall not preclude a charge for a commission of any other 
se. 1973 
205. Manufacture or posses s ion of ins trument for 
burglary or theft. 
y person who manufactures or possesses any instrument, 
device, article, or other thing adapted, designed, or 
lonly used in advancing or facilitating the commission of 
ffense under circumstances manifesting an intent to use 
owledge that some person intends to use the same in the 
lission of a burglary or theft is guilty of a class B 
smeanor. 1973 
206. Criminal trespass . 
For purposes of this section "enter" means intrusion of 
ntire body. 
(2) A person is guilty of criminal trespass if, under circuia. 
stances not amounting to burglary as defined in Section 
76-6-202, 76-6-203, or 76-6-204: 
(a) he enters or remains unlawfully on property and: 
(i) intends to cause annoyance or injury to any 
person or damage to any property, including the use 
of graffiti as defined in Section 76-6-107; 
(ii) intends to commit any crime, other than theft 
or a felony; or 
(iii) is reckless as to whether his presence will 
cause fear for the safety of another; or 
(b) knowing his entry or presence is unlawful, he 
enters or remains on property as to which notice against 
entering is given by: 
(i) personal communication to the actor by the 
owner or someone with apparent authority to act for 
the owner; 
(ii) fencing or other enclosure obviously designed 
to exclude intruders; 
(iii) posting of signs reasonably likely to come to 
the attention of intruders. 
(3) (a) A violation of Subsection (2)(a) is a class C misde-
meanor unless it was committed in a dwelling, in which 
event it is a class B misdemeanor. 
(b) A violation of Subsection (2Kb) is an infraction. 
(4) It is a defense to prosecution under this section that the: 
(a) property was open to the public when the actor 
entered or remained; and 
(b) actor's conduct did not substantially interfere with 
the owner's use of the property. 1996 
76-6-206.1. Criminal trespass of abandoned or inactive 
mines — Penalty. 
(1) For purposes of this section: 
(a) "Abandoned or inactive mine" means an under-
ground mine which is no longer open for access or no 
longer under excavation and has been clearly marked as 
closed or protected from entry. 
(b) "Enter" means intrusion of the entire body. 
(2) A person is guilty of criminal trespass of an abandoned 
or inactive mine if, under circumstances not amounting to 
burglary as defined in Section 76-6-202, 76-6-203, or 76-6-204: 
(a) the person intentionally enters and remains unlaw-
fully in the underground workings of an abandoned or 
inactive mine; or 
(b) intentionally and without authority removes, de-; 
stroys, or tampers with any warning sign, covering 
fencing, or other method of protection from entry placed • 
on, around, or over any mine shaft, mine portal, or other 
abandoned or inactive mining excavation property. I.* v 
(3) A violation of Subsection (2)(a) is a class B misdemeanor J 
(4) A violation of Subsection (2)(b) is a class A misdemeanor 
PART 3 
ROBBERY 
76-6-301. Robbery. 
(1) A person commits robbery if: 
(a) the person unlawfully and intentionally takes < 
at tempts to take personal property in the possession, 
another from his person, or immediate presence, agai*" 
his will, by means of force or fear; or 
(b) the person intentionally or knowingly uses force 
fear of immediate force against another in the c o u r S ^ | 
committing a theft. 
(2) An act shall be considered "in the course of coininip 
a theft" if it occurs in an attempt to commit theft, con 
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297 CRIMINAL CODE 76-6-404.5 
fc<Jf theft, or in the immediate flight after the attempt or 
^commission. 
E ^ t (3) Robbery is a felony of the second degree. 1995 
|76-6-302. Aggravated robbery. 
IJV (1) A person commits aggravated robbery if in the course of 
^^(cbmmit t ing robbery, he: 
fist** (a) u s e s o r threatens to use a dangerous weapon as 
defined in Section 76-1-601; 
rs&**f (k) causes serious bodily injury upon another; or 
£%«£ J? (c) takes an operable motor vehicle. 
(2) Aggravated robbery is a first degree felony. 
(3) For the purposes of this part, an act shall be considered 
if.' 'to be "in the course of committing a robbery" if it occurs in an 
.Vj,ufattempt to commit, during the commission of, or in the 
C ' T / 
%rW'J 
lly takes or 
ossession of 
ace, against 
ises force or 
le course of 
committing 
commission 
'immediate flight after the attempt or commission of a robbery. 
1994 
PART 4 
THEFT 
76-6-401. Definitions. 
For the purposes of this part: 
} (1) "Property'' means anything of value, including real 
estate, tangible and intangible personal property, cap-
tured or domestic animals and birds, written instruments 
or other writings representing or embodying rights con-
cerning real or personal property, labor, services, or oth-
erwise containing anything of value to the owner, com-
modities of a public utility nature such as 
telecommunications, gas, electricity, steam, or water, and 
trade secrets, meaning the whole or any portion of any 
scientific or technical information, design, process, proce-
dure, formula or invention which the owner thereof in-
tends to be available only to persons selected by him. 
(2) "Obtain" means, in relation to property, to bring 
about a transfer of possession or of some other legally 
recognized interest in property, whether to the obtainer or 
another; in relation to labor or services, to secure perfor-
mance thereof; and in relation to a trade secret, to make 
any facsimile, replica, photograph, or other reproduction. 
(3) "Purpose to deprive" means to have the conscious 
object: 
(a) To withhold property permanently or for so 
extended a period or to use under such circumstances 
tha t a substantial portion of its economic value, or of 
the use and benefit thereof, would be lost; or 
(b) To restore the property only upon payment of a 
reward or other compensation; or 
(c) To dispose of the property under circumstances 
that make it unlikely that the owner will recover it. 
(4) "Obtain or exercise unauthorized control" means, 
but is not necessarily limited to, conduct heretofore de-
fined or known as common-law larceny by trespassory 
taking, larceny by conversion, larceny by bailee, and 
embezzlement. 
(5) "Deception" occurs when a person intentionally: 
(a) Creates or confirms by words or conduct an 
impression of law or fact that is false and that the 
actor does not believe to be true and that is likely to 
affect the judgment of another in the transaction; or 
(b) Fails to correct a false impression of law or fact 
tha t the actor previously created or confirmed by 
words or conduct that is likely to affect the judgment 
of another and that the actor does not now believe to 
be true; or 
(c) Prevents another from acquiring information 
likely to affect his judgment in the transaction; or 
(d) Sells or otherwise transfers or encumbers prop-
erty without disclosing a lien, security interest, ad-
verse claim, or other legal impediment to the enjoy-
ment of the property, whether the lien, security 
interest, claim, or impediment is or is not valid or is 
or is not a mat ter of official record; or 
(e) Promises performance that is likely to affect 
the judgment of another in the transaction, which 
performance the actor does not intend to perform or 
knows will not be performed; provided, however, that 
failure to perform the promise in issue without other 
evidence of intent or knowledge is not sufficient proof 
that the actor did not intend to perform or knew the 
promise would not be performed. 1973 
76-6-402. Presumpt ions and defenses . 
The following presumption shall be applicable to this part: 
(1) Possession of property recently stolen, when no 
satisfactory explanation of such possession is made, shall 
be deemed prima facie evidence that the person in pos-
session stole the property. 
(2) It is no defense under this part that the actor has an 
interest in the property or service stolen if another person 
also has an interest that the actor is not entitled to 
infringe, provided an interest in property for purposes of 
this subsection shall not include a security interest for the 
repayment of a debt or obligation. 
(3) It is a defense under this part that the actor: 
(a) Acted under an honest claim of right to the 
property or service involved; or 
(b) Acted in the honest belief that he had the right 
to obtain or exercise control over the property or 
service as he did; or 
(c) Obtained or exercised control over the property 
or service honestly believing that the owner, if 
present, would have consented. 1974 
76-6-403. Theft — Evidence to support accusat ion. 
Conduct denominated theft in this part constitutes a single 
offense embracing the separate offenses such as those hereto-
fore known as larceny, larceny by trick, larceny by bailees, 
embezzlement, false pretense, extortion, blackmail, receiving 
stolen property. An accusation of theft may be supported by 
evidence that it was committed in any manner specified in 
Sections 76-6-404 through 76-6-410, subject to the power of 
the court to ensure a fair trial by granting a continuance or 
other appropriate relief where the conduct of the defense 
would be prejudiced by lack of fair notice or by surprise. 1974 
76-6-404. Theft — E lements . 
A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises unautho-
rized control over the property of another with a purpose to 
deprive him thereof. 1973 
76-6-404.5. Wrongful appropriat ion — Penalt ies . 
(1) A person commits wrongful appropriation if he obtains 
or exercises unauthorized control over the property of another, 
without the consent of the owner or legal custodian and with 
intent to temporarily appropriate, possess, or use the property 
or to temporarily deprive the owner or legal custodian of 
possession of the property. 
(2) The consent of the owner or legal custodian of the 
property to its control by the actor is not presumed or implied 
because of the owner's or legal custodian's consent on a 
previous occasion to the control of the property by any person. 
(3) Wrongful appropriation is punishable one degree lower 
than theft, as provided in Section 76-6-412, so that a violation 
which would have been: 
(a) a second degree felony under Section 76-6-412 if it 
had been theft is a third degree felony if it is wrongful 
appropriation; 
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(f) final orders and decrees of the district court review 
)f informal adjudicative proceedings of agencies under 
Subsection (e); 
(g) a final judgment or decree of any court of record 
lolding a statute of the United States or this state 
mconstitutional on its face under the Constitution of the 
Jnited States or the Utah Constitution; 
(h) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in-
volving a charge of a first degree or capital felony; 
(i) appeals from the district court involving a conviction 
)f a first degree or capital felony; 
(j) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of 
•ecord over which the Court of Appeals does not have 
>riginal appellate jurisdiction; and 
(k) appeals from the district court of orders, judgments, 
)r decrees ruling on legislative subpoenas. 
The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court of Ap-
; any of the matters over which the Supreme Court has 
rial appellate jurisdiction, except: 
(a) capital felony convictions or an appeal of an inter-
ocutory order of a court of record involving a charge of a 
:apital felony; 
(b) election and voting contests; 
(c) reapportionment of election districts; 
(d) retention or removal of public officers; 
(e) matters involving legislative subpoenas; and 
(f) those matters described in Subsections (3)(a) 
through (d). 
The Supreme Court has sole discretion in granting or 
ing a petition for writ of certiorari for the review of a 
t of Appeals adjudication, but the Supreme Court shall 
iw those cases certified to it by the Court of Appeals under 
;ection (3Kb). 
' The Supreme Court shall comply with the requirements 
tie 63, Chapter 46b, in its review of agency adjudicative 
sedings. 1996 
-3. Repealed. 1986 
-4. Supreme Court — Rulemaking, judges pro tem-
pore, and practice of law. 
) The Supreme Court shall adopt rules of procedure and 
snce for use in the courts of the state and shall by rule 
age the appellate process. The Legislature may amend 
rules of procedure and evidence adopted by the Supreme 
rt upon a vote of two-thirds of all members of both houses 
ie Legislature. 
) Except as otherwise provided by the Utah Constitution, 
Supreme Court by rule may authorize retired justices and 
es and judges pro tempore to perform any judicial duties. 
*es pro tempore shall be citizens of the United States, 
i residents, and admitted to practice law in Utah. 
) The Supreme Court shall by rule govern the practice of 
including admission to practice law and the conduct and 
ipline of persons admitted to the practice of law. 1986 
1-5. Repealed. 1988 
;-6. Appellate court administrator. 
ie appellate court administrator shall appoint clerks and 
x>rt staff as necessary for the operation of the Supreme 
rt and the Court of Appeals. The duties of the clerks and 
)ort staff shall be established by the appellate court 
inistrator, and powers established by rule of the Supreme 
r t . 1986 
!-7. Repealed. 1986 
!-7.5. Service of sheriff to court. 
ie court may at any time require the attendance and 
ices of any sheriff in the state. 1988 
!-8 to 78-2-14. Repealed. 1986,1988 
Section 
78-2a-l. 
78-2a-2. 
78-2a-3. 
78-2a-4. 
78-2a-5. 
CHAPTER 2a 
COURT OF APPEALS 
Creation — Seal. 
Number of judges — Terms — Functions 
Filing fees. 
Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
Review of actions by Supreme Court. 
Location of Court of Appeals. 
78-2a-l. Creation •— Seal. 
There is created a court known as the Court of Appeals. The 
Court of Appeals is a court of record and shall have a seal. 
1986 
78-2a-2. Number of judges — Terms — Funct ions — 
Fil ing fees. 
(1) The Court of Appeals consists of seven judges. The term 
of appointment to office as a judge of the Court of Appeals is 
until the first general election held more than three years 
after the effective date of the appointment. Thereafter, the 
term of office of a judge of the Court of Appeals is six years and 
commences on the first Monday in January, next following the 
date of election. A judge whose term expires may serve, upon 
request of the Judicial Council, until a successor is appointed 
and qualified. The presiding judge of the Court of Appeals 
shall receive as additional compensation $1,000 per annum or 
fraction thereof for the period served. 
(2) The Court of Appeals shall sit and render judgment in 
panels of three judges. Assignment to panels shall be by 
random rotation of all judges of the Court of Appeals. The 
Court of Appeals by rule shall provide for the selection of a 
chair for each panel. The Court of Appeals may not sit en banc. 
(3) The judges of the Court of Appeals shall elect a presid-
ing judge from among the members of the court by majority 
vote of all judges. The term of office of the presiding judge is 
two years and until a successor is elected. A presiding judge of 
the Court of Appeals may serve in that office no more than two 
successive terms. The Court of Appeals may by rule provide for 
an acting presiding judge to serve in the absence or incapacity 
of the presiding judge. 
(4) The presiding judge may be removed from the office of 
presiding judge by majority vote of all judges of the Court of 
Appeals. In addition to the duties of a judge of the Court of 
Appeals, the presiding judge shall: 
(a) administer the rotation and scheduling of panels; 
(b) act as liaison with the Supreme Court; 
(c) call and preside over the meetings of the Court of 
Appeals; and 
(d) carry out duties prescribed by the Supreme Court 
and the Judicial Council. 
(5) Filing fees for the Court of Appeals are the same as for 
the Supreme Court. 1988 
78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jur isdict ion . 
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all ex-
traordinary writs and to issue all writs and process necessary: 
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and de-
crees; or 
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, includ-
ing jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal 
adjudicative proceedings of state agencies or appeals from 
the district court review of informal adjudicative proceed-
ings of the agencies, except the Public Service Commis-
sion, State Tax Commission, School and Institutional 
Trust Lands Board of Trustees, Division of Forestry, Fire 
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ess necessary1 
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rvice Commis-
[ Institutional 
' Forestry, Fire 
and State Lands actions reviewed by the executive direc-
tor of the Department of Natural Resources, Board of Oil, 
Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer; 
(b) appeals from the district court review.of: 
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political 
subdivisions of the state or other local agencies; and 
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section 
63-46a-12.1; 
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts; 
(d) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in 
criminal cases, except those involving a charge of a first 
' ' degree or capital felony; 
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, 
except those involving a conviction of a first degree or 
capital felony; 
(f) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary 
writs sought by persons who are incarcerated or serving 
1
 any other criminal sentence, except petitions constituting 
a challenge to a conviction of or the sentence for a first 
degree or capital felony; 
(g) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordi-
nary writs challenging the decisions of the Board of 
Pardons and Parole except in cases involving a first 
degree or capital felony; 
(h) appeals from district court involving domestic rela-
tions cases, including, but not limited to, divorce, annul-
ment, property division, child custody, support, visitation, 
adoption, and paternity; 
(i) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and 
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the 
Supreme Court. 
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by 
the vote of four judges of the court may certify to the Supreme 
Court for original appellate review and determination any 
matter over which the Court of Appeals has original appellate 
jurisdiction. 
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the require-
ments of Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures 
Act, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings. 1996 
78-2a-4. R e v i e w of act ions by Supreme Court. 
Review of the judgments, orders, and decrees of the Court of 
Appeals shall be by petition for writ of certiorari to the 
Supreme Court. 1986 
78-2a-5. Locat ion of Court of Appeals . 
The Court of Appeals has its principal location in Salt Lake 
City. The Court of Appeals may perform any of its functions in 
any location within the state. 1986 
CHAPTER 3 
DISTRICT COURTS 
Section 
78-3-1 to 78-3-2. Repealed. 
78-3-3. Term of judges — Vacancy. 
78-3-4. Jurisdiction — Appeals. 
78-3-5. Repealed. 
78-3-6. Terms — Minimum of once quarterly. 
78-3-7 to 78-3-11. Repealed. 
78-3-11.5. State District Court Administrative System. 
78-3-12. Repealed. 
78-3-12.5. Costs of system. 
78-3-13. Repealed. 
78-3-13.4. Transfer of court operating responsibilities — 
Facilities — Staff — Budget. 
78-3-13.5, 78-3-14. Repealed. 
78-3-14.2. District court case management. 
78-3-14.5. Allocation of district court fees and forfeitures. 
Section 
78-3-15 to 
78-3-17.5. 
78-3-18. 
78-3-19. 
78-3-20. 
78-3-21. 
78-3-21.5. 
78-3-22. 
78-3-23. 
78-3-24. 
78-3-25. 
78-3-26. 
78-3-27. 
78-3-28. 
78-3-29. 
78-3-30. 
78-3-31. 
78-3-4 
78-3-17. Repealed. 
Application of savings accruing to counties. 
Judicial Administration Act — Short title. 
Purpose of act. 
Definitions. 
Judicial Council — Creation — Members — 
Terms and election — Responsibilities — 
Reports. 
Data bases for judicial boards. 
Presiding officer — Compensation — Duties. 
Administrator of the courts — Appointment — 
Qualifications — Salary. 
Court administrator — Powers, duties, and 
responsibilities. 
Assistants for administrator of the courts — 
Appointment of trial court executives. 
Courts to provide information and statistical 
data to administrator of the courts. 
Annual judicial conference. 
Repealed. 
Presiding judge —Associate presiding judge — 
Election — Term — Compensation — Powers 
— Duties. 
Duties of the clerk of the district court. 
Court commissioners — Qualifications — Ap-
pointment — Functions governed by rule. 
78-3-1 to 78-3-2. Repealed. 1971, 1981, 1988 
78-3-3. Term of judges — Vacancy. 
Judges of the district courts shall be appointed initially 
until the first general election held more than three years 
after the effective date of the appointment. Thereafter, the 
term of office for judges of the district courts is six years, and 
commences on the first Monday in January, next following the 
date of election. A judge whose term expires may serve, upon 
request of the Judicial Council, until a successor is appointed 
and qualified. 1988 
78-3-4. Jurisdict ion — Appeals . 
(1) The district court has original jurisdiction in all matters 
civil and criminal, not excepted in the Utah Constitution and 
not prohibited by law. 
(2) The district court judges may issue all extraordinary 
writs and other writs necessary to carry into effect their 
orders, judgments, and decrees. 
(3) The district court has jurisdiction over matters of law-
yer discipline consistent with the rules of the Supreme Court. 
(4) The district court has jurisdiction over all matters 
properly filed in the circuit court prior to July 1, 1996. 
(5) The district court has appellate jurisdiction to adjudi-
cate trials de novo of the judgments of the justice court and of 
the small claims department of the district court. 
(6) Appeals from the final orders, judgments, and decrees of 
the district court are under Sections 78-2-2 and 78-2a-3. 
(7) The district court has jurisdiction to review agency 
adjudicative proceedings as set forth in Title 63, Chapter 46b, 
Administrative Procedures Act, and shall comply with the 
requirements of that chapter, in its review of agency adjudi-
cative proceedings. 
(8) Notwithstanding Subsection (1), the district court has 
subject matter jurisdiction in class B misdemeanors, class C 
misdemeanors, infractions, and violations of ordinances only 
if: 
(a) there is no justice court with territorial jurisdiction; 
(b) the matter was properly filed in the circuit court 
prior to July 1, 1996; 
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block procedure where enforcement officers stop all, or a 
designated sequence of, motor vehicles traveling on high-
ways and roads and subject those vehicles to inspection or 
testing and the drivers or occupants to questioning or the 
production of documents. 
(2) "Command level officer" includes all sheriffs, heads 
of law enforcement agencies, and all supervisory enforce-
ment officers of sergeant rank or higher. 
(3) "Emergency circumstances" means circumstances 
where enforcement officers reasonably believe road condi-
tions, weather conditions, or persons present a significant 
hazard to persons or the property of other persons. 
(4) "Enforcement officer" includes: 
(a) peace officers as defined in Title 53, Chapter 13, 
Peace Officer Classifications; 
(b) correctional officers as defined in Title 53, 
Chapter 13; 
(c) special function officers as defined and under 
the restrictions of Title 53, Chapter 13; and 
(d) federal officers as defined in Title 53, Chapter 
13. 
(5) "Magistrate" includes all judicial officers enumer-
ated in Subsection 77-1-3(4). 
(6) "Motor vehicle" includes all vehicles as defined in 
Title 41, Chapter la . 1998 
r
-23-103. Circumstances permitt ing an administra-
t ive traffic checkpoint . 
A motor vehicle may be stopped and the occupants detained 
r
 an enforcement officer when the enforcement officer: 
(1) is acting pursuant to a duly authorized search 
warrant or arrest warrant; 
(2) has probable cause to arrest or search; 
(3) has reasonable suspicion that criminal activity has 
occurred or is occurring; 
(4) is acting under emergency circumstances; or 
(5) is acting pursuant to duly authorized administra-
tive traffic checkpoint authority granted by a magistrate 
in accordance with Section 77-23-104. 1992 
7-23-104. Written plan — Approval of magistrate . 
(1) An administrative traffic checkpoint may be established 
nd operated upon written authority of a magistrate. 
(2) A magistrate may issue written authority to establish 
nd operate an administrative traffic checkpoint if: 
(a) a command level officer submits to the magistrate a 
written plan signed by the command level officer describ-
ing: 
(i) the location of the checkpoint including geo-
graphical and topographical information; 
(ii) the date, time, and duration of the checkpoint; 
(iii) the sequence of traffic to be stopped; 
(iv) the purpose of the checkpoint, including the 
inspection or inquiry to be conducted; 
(v) the minimum number of personnel to be em-
ployed in operating the checkpoint, including the 
rank of the officer or officers in charge at the scene; 
(vi) the configuration and location of signs, barri-
ers, and other means of informing approaching mo-
torists that they must stop and directing them to the 
place to stop; 
(vii) any advance notice to the public at large of the 
establishment of the checkpoint; and 
(viii) the instructions to be given to the enforce-
ment officers operating the checkpoint; and 
(b) the magistrate makes an independent judicial de-
termination that the plan appropriately: 
(i) minimizes the length of time the motorist will 
be delayed; 
(ii) minimizes the intrusion of the inspection or 
inquiry; 
(iii) minimizes the fear and anxiety the motorist 
will experience; 
(iv) minimizes the degree of discretion to be exer-
cised by the individual enforcement officers operating 
the checkpoint; and 
(v) maximizes the safety of the motorist and the 
enforcement officers. 
(3) Upon determination by the magistrate that the plan 
meets the requirements of Subsection (2Kb), the magistrate 
shall sign the authorization and issue it to the command level 
officer, retaining a copy for the court's file. 
(4) A copy of the plan and signed authorization shall be 
issued to the checkpoint command level officer participating in 
the operation of the checkpoint. 
(5) Any enforcement officer participating in the operation of 
the checkpoint shall conform his activities as nearly as prac-
ticable to the procedures outlined in the plan. 
(6) The checkpoint command level officer shall be available 
to exhibit a copy of the plan and signed authorization to any 
motorist who has been stopped at the checkpoint upon request 
of the motorist. 1997 
77-23-105. Fai lure to stop — Criminal liability. 
Any person who intentionally and knowingly passes, with-
out stopping as required, any administrative traffic check-
point operated under the authority of a magistrate as provided 
in Section 77-23-104 is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. 1992 
PART 2 
SEARCH WARRANTS 
77-23-201. "Search warrant" denned. 
A search warrant is an order issued by a magistrate in the 
name of the state and directed to a peace officer, describing 
with particularity the thing, place, or person to be searched 
and the property or evidence to be seized by him and brought 
before the magistrate. 1994 
77-23-202. Grounds for issuance. 
Property or evidence may be seized pursuant to a search 
warrant if there is probable cause to believe it: 
(1) was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed; 
(2) has been used or is possessed for the purpose of 
being used to commit or conceal the commission of an 
offense; or 
(3) is evidence of illegal conduct. 1994 
77-23-203. Condit ions precedent to i ssuance . 
( D A search warrant shall not issue except upon probable 
cause supported by oath or affirmation particularly describing 
the person or place to be searched and the person, property, or 
evidence to be seized. 
(2) If the item sought to be seized is evidence of illegal 
conduct, and is in the possession of a person or entity for which 
there is insufficient probable cause shown to the magistrate to 
believe tha t such person or entity is a party to the alleged 
illegal conduct, no search warrant shall issue except upon a 
finding by the magistrate that the evidence sought to be seized 
cannot be obtained by subpoena, or that such evidence would 
be concealed, destroyed, damaged, or altered if sought by 
subpoena. If such a finding is made and a search warrant 
issued, the magistrate shall direct upon the warrant sucfl 
conditions tha t reasonably afford protection of the following 
interests of the person or entity in possession of such evidence-
(a) protection against unreasonable interference witn 
normal business; , 
(b) protection against the loss or disclosure of protected 
confidential sources of information; or 
423 
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l e a of proof in proceedings on violat ions 
^Enforcement officers exempt from liability. 
• not necessary for the state to negate any exemption 
'fset forth in this act in any complaint, information, 
ttjjr j>ther pleading or trial, hearing, or other pro-
ber this act, and the burden of proof of any 
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1971 
^ R e p e a l e d . 1997 
Judicial review. 
person aggrieved by a department's final order may 
icial review. 
aaue for judicial review of informal adjudicative pro-
" 'i in the district court of Salt Lake County. 1987 
•(Prior prosecut ions and proceedings contin-
u e d — Uniform construct ion. 
^Prosecution for violation of any law or offense occur-
jJSior to the effective date of this act shall not be 
^ by this act; provided, that sentences imposed 
r^the effective date of this act may not exceed the 
Qum terms specified and the judge has discretion to 
s any minimum sentence. 
fl^Civil seizures, forfeitures, and injunctive proceed-
i commenced prior to the effective date of this act shall 
tbe affected by this act. 
V All administrative proceedings pending before any 
' or court on the effective date of this act shall be 
pued and brought to final determination in accor-
• with laws and regulations in effect prior to the 
ve date of this act. Drugs placed under control prior 
actment of this act which are not listed within 
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(b) All monies forfeited or seized to the state through 
the state or federal court process as a result of activity 
involving a controlled substance violation as prohibited 
under Title 58, Chapter 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d, or 
prohibited under federal law, shall be deposited into the 
Drug Forfeiture Account. 
(2) The Department of Public Safety may expend amounts 
as appropriated by the Legislature from the Drug Forfeiture 
Account to aid in enforcement efforts to combat drug traffick-
ing. 
(3) That portion of funds forfeited or siezed that are re-
quired to be disbursed to other governmental entities under 
existing contractual agreements are exempt from this section. 
(4) Funds forfeited or seized as a result of the Salt Lake 
Airport Drug Program, not to exceed the Department of Public 
Safety's expenditure to that program, are exempt from this 
section. 
(5) The Department of Public Safety as part of the annual 
budget hearings shall provide the Executive Offices, Criminal 
Justice, and Legislature Appropriations Subcommittee with a 
complete accounting of expenditures and revenues from the 
funds under this section. 
(6) The Legislature may annually provide, in the Appro-
priations Act, legislative direction for anticipated expendi-
tures of the monies received under this section. 1996 
58-37-21. Admissibi l i ty of Utah State Crime Labora-
tory documents — Drug analysis in criminal 
pretrial proceedings . 
The commissioner of the Department of Public Safety shall 
establish standards for administration and interpretation of 
chemical and forensic analysis in accordance with Title 63, 
Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act, of: 
(1) controlled substances as provided in Title 58, Chap-
ter 37; 
(2) drug paraphernalia as provided in Title 58, Chapter 
37a; 
(3) imitation controlled substances as provided in Title 
58, Chapter 37b; and 
(4) controlled substance precursors as provided in Title 
58, Chapter 37d. 1995 
CHAPTER 37a 
DRUG PARAPHERNALIA 
Section 
58-37a-l. 
58-37a-2. 
58-37a-3. 
58-37a-4. 
58-37a-5. 
58-37a-6. 
Short title. 
Purpose. 
"Drug paraphernalia" defined. 
Considerations in determining whether object is 
drug paraphernalia. 
Unlawful acts. 
Seizure — Forfeiture — Property rights. 
1992 ^ p e a l e d . 
" ^ g Forfeiture Account created — Revenue 
sources — Use of account des ignated. 
- k e r e i s created in the General Fund a restricted 
n t c a l led the "Drug Forfeiture Account." 
58-37a-l. Short title. 
This chapter shall be known and may be cited as the "Utah 
Drug Paraphernalia Act." 1981 
58-37a-2. Purpose . 
It is the intent of this chapter to discourage the use of 
narcotics by eliminating paraphernalia designed for process-
ing, ingesting, or otherwise using a controlled substance. 
1981 
58-37a-3. "Drug paraphernal ia" defined. 
As used in this chapter: 
"Drug paraphernalia" means any equipment, product, 
or material used, or intended for use. to plant, propagate, 
cultivate, grow, harvest, manufacture, compound, con-
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vert, produce, process, prepare, test, analyze, package, 
repackage, store, contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale, or 
to otherwise introduce a controlled substance into the 
human body in violation of Title 58, Chapter 37, and 
includes, but is not limited to: 
(1) Kits used, or intended for use, in planting, 
propagating, cultivating, growing, or harvesting any 
species of plant which is a controlled substance or 
from which a controlled substance can be derived; 
(2) Kits used, or intended for use, in manufactur-
ing, compounding, converting, producing, processing, 
or preparing a controlled substance; 
(3) Isomerization devices used, or intended for use, 
to increase the potency of any species of plant which 
is a controlled substance; 
(4) Testing equipment used, or intended for use, to 
identify or to analyze the strength, effectiveness, or 
purity of a controlled substance; 
(5) Scales and balances used, or intended for use, 
in weighing or measuring a controlled substance; 
(6) Diluents and adulterants, such as quinine hy-
drochloride, mannitol, mannited, dextrose and lac-
tose, used, or intended for use to cut a controlled 
substance; 
(7) Separation gins and sifters used, or intended 
for use to remove twigs, seeds, or other impurities 
from marihuana; 
(8) Blenders, bowls, containers, spoons and mixing 
devices used, or intended for use to compound a 
controlled substance; 
(9) Capsules, balloons, envelopes, and other con-
tainers used, or intended for use to package small 
quantities of a controlled substance; 
(10) Containers and other objects used, or in-
tended for use to store or conceal a controlled sub-
stance; 
(11) Hypodermic syringes, needles, and other ob-
jects used, or intended for use to parenterally inject a 
controlled substance into the human body; and 
(12) Objects used, or intended for use to ingest, 
inhale, or otherwise introduce marihuana, cocaine, 
hashish, or hashish oil into the human body, includ-
ing but not limited to: 
(a) Metal, wooden, acrylic, glass, stone, plas-
tic, or ceramic pipes with or without screens, 
permanent screens, hashish heads, or punctured 
metal bowls; 
(b) Water pipes; 
(c) Carburetion tubes and devices; 
(d) Smoking and carburetion masks; 
(e) Roach clips: meaning objects used to hold 
burning material, such as a marihuana cigarette, 
that has become too small or too short to be held 
in the hand; 
If) Miniature cocaine spoons and cocaine vi-
als; 
(g) Chamber pipes; 
(h) Carburetor pipes; 
(i) Electric pipes; 
(j) Air-driven pipes; 
(k) Chillums; 
(1) Bongs; and 
(m) Ice pipes or chillers. 1981 
>8-37a-4. C o n s i d e r a t i o n s in d e t e r m i n i n g w h e t h e r ob-
j ec t is d r u g p a r a p h e r n a l i a . 
In determining whether an object is drug paraphernalia, the 
:rier of fact, in addition to all other logically relevant factors, 
should consider: 
(1) statements by an owner or by anyone in control rf 
the object concerning its use; J 
(2) prior convictions, if any, of an owner, or of anyone in 
control of the object, under any state or federal la^J 
relating to a controlled substance; ; 
(3) the proximity of the object, in time and space, to*1 
direct violation of this chapter; *vKL37b-8 
(4) the proximity of the object to a controlled substan^ 
(5) the existence of any residue of a controlled sub., 
stance on the object; J 
(6) instructions whether oral or written, provided wit£ 
the object concerning its use; 'C$ 
jl5 
Manufacture, di: 
stance unlawfi 
Repealed. 
Use of substance 
Advertisement oi 
Exemption of p 
trolled Substai 
a f $j7b-l. S h o r t t i t le . 
^ tS fliis act shall be known anc 
« I U , ^ W i l l e d Substances Act.'" 
(7) descriptive materials accompanying the object m 
which explain or depict its use; & W -^ « 
(8) national and local advertising concerning its use; ;* L. 
(9) the manner in which the object is displayed for sale*" fir -
(10) whether the owner or anyone in control of the" 
object is a legitimate supplier of like or related items to 
the community, such as a licensed distributor or dealer of S ; 
tobacco products; "•" ™r 
(11) direct or circumstantial evidence of the ratio of 
sales of the object to the total sales of the businesT 
enterprise; : * ' 
(12) the existence and scope of legitimate uses of the I 
object in the community; and 
(13) expert testimony concerning its use. 
58-37a-5. Unlawfu l ac t s . ^% 
(1) It is unlawful for any person to use, or to possess witk I 
intent to use, drug paraphernalia to plant, propagate, cult j 
vate, grow, harvest, manufacture, compound, convert, pro»»] 
duce, process, prepare, test, analyze, pack, repack, stow^l 
contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale or otherwise introducerRj 
"5* 
*3fl>*2' Defini t ions . 
' As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Controlled substar 
provided in Section 58-37 
(2) "Distribute" means 
tempted sale, transfer, de 
of an imitation controlled 
K - (3) "Imitation controlle< 
R that is not a controlled sut 
substance, and which by o 
resembles a specific contr 
R* including its color, shape. 
K* (4) "Manufacture" meai 
K . compounding, processing, 
Iff* aging or repackaging, lab< 
K ' tion controlled substance. 
contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale or otner ise mtrwuuw^ » • me appearance oi the 
controlled substance into the human body in violation of tingK&ient to establish that 
chapter. Any person who violates this subsection is guilty'rfK«W-«~J ~~i~~* -~ :-
class B misdemeanor. \Jg 
(2) It is unlawful for any person to deliver, possess wrt^ 
intent to deliver, or manufacture with intent to deliver, a* 
drug paraphernalia, knowing that the drug paraphernalia wfl 
be used to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest, man* ^ _ i V ^ 
facture compound, convert, produce, process, prepare, ^ i g £ (2) statements made to 
analyze, pack, repack, store, contain, conceal, inject, inge£ 
inhale, or otherwise introduce a controlled substance into a t 
human body in violation of this act. Any person who violate 
this subsection is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. *W 
(3) Any person 18 years of age or over who delivers dnf 
paraphernalia to a person under 18 years of age who is thr* 
years or more younger than the person making the deliver/^ 
guilty of a third degree felony. #-
(4) It is unlawful for any person to place in this state in 
newspaper, magazine, handbill, or other publication any. 
vertisement, knowing that the purpose of the advertiseme1 
to promote the sale of drug paraphernalia. Any person _ ^ 
violates this subsection is guilty of a class B misdemeanjg 
58-37a-6. Se i zu re — F o r f e i t u r e — P r o p e r t y r igh t 
Drug paraphernalia is subject to seizure and forfeiture* 
no property right can exist in it. ** 
C H A P T E R 37b 
IMITATION CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES 
W7b-3. C o n s i d e r a t i o n s i] 
%j&r s t ance is imi t a t io 
If the appearance of the c 
t: 
>Ued substance, as in iiq 
should be considered: 
(1) statements made by 
control of the substance. 
^'substance, its use or effect. 
£* substance; 
Section 
58-37b-l. 
58-37b-2. 
58-37b-3. 
Short title. 
Definitions. 
Considerations in determining whether 
stance is imitation controlled substance; 
|ttay be resold at a price 
flsual and customary price 
"~i the substance; 
^ (3) whether the substan 
manner similar to that j 
^ s t ances ; 
evasive tactics or ac 
;on in control of the si 
. enforcement authority 
j5) prior convictions of a; 
object, under state or fe 
-ances or fraud; and 
) the proximity of the 
tees. 
Manufac tu re , d i s 
v subs t ance unlawfu 
Unlawful for any person 
V^ith intent to distril 
Any person who viol 
^misdemeanor. 
• ^ Repea led . 
f Use of s u b s t a n c e i 
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s
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lend. I UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 654 
AMENDMENT I AMENDMENT VIII 
digious a n d po l i t i ca l f reedom.] 
ongress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
gion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging 
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people 
ceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a 
ress of grievances. 
AMENDMENT II 
ght t o bear a rms . ] 
i well-regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a 
b State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall 
be infringed. 
AMENDMENT III 
u a r t e r i n g soldiers . ] 
^o Soldier shall, in time of peace, be quartered in any house, 
;hout the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a 
nner to be prescribed by law. 
AMENDMENT IV 
n r e a s o n a b l e s e a r c h e s a n d se izures . ] 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
pers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and sei-
res, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but 
on probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
rticularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
rsons or things to be seized. 
AMENDMENT V 
r i m i n a l a c t i o n s — P r o v i s i o n s c o n c e r n i n g — Due pro-
ss of l aw a n d j u s t c o m p e n s a t i o n c lauses . ] 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise 
famous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a 
•and Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, 
in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or 
iblic danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same 
fence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be 
mpelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, 
>r be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process 
law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, 
ithout just compensation. 
AMENDMENT VI 
t i gh t s of accused . ] 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
ght to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the 
tate and district wherein the crime shall have been commit-
>d, which district shall have been previously ascertained by 
w, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the 
:cusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to 
ave compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, 
rid to have the Assistance of counsel for his defence. 
AMENDMENT VII 
[Vial by j u r y in civil cases . ] 
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy 
ball exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be 
reserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise 
e-examined in any Court of the United States, than according 
3 the rules of the common law. 
[Bail — Punishment . ] 
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines 
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted. 
AMENDMENT DC 
[Rights re ta ined by people . ] 
The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall 
not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the 
people. 
AMENDMENT X 
[Powers reserved to s tates or people.] 
The powers not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to 
the States respectively, or to the people. 
AMENDMENT XI 
[Suits against s tates — Restr ict ion of judic ia l power.] 
The judicial power of the United States shall not be con-
strued to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or 
prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of 
another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State. 
AMENDMENT XII 
[Election of Pres ident and Vice-President.] 
The Electors shall meet in their respective states, and vote 
by ballot for President and Vice-President, one of whom, at 
least, shall not be an inhabitant of the same state with 
themselves; they shall name in their ballots the person voted 
for as President, and in distinct ballots the person voted for as 
Vice-President, and they shall make distinct lists of all per-
sons voted for as President, and of all persons voted for as 
Vice-President, and of the number of votes for each, which lists 
they shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to the seat of 
the Government of the United States, directed to the Presi-
dent of the Senate;—The President of the Senate shall, in the 
presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, open all 
the certificates and the votes shall then be counted;—The 
person having the greatest number of votes for President, -
shall be the President, if such number be a majority of the 
whole number of Electors appointed; and if no person have 
such majority, then from the persons having the highest 
numbers not exceeding three on the list of those voted for as 
President, the House of Representatives shall choose immedi- ^ 
ately, by ballot, the President. But in choosing the President, 
the votes shall be taken by states, the representation froflj-j 
each state having one vote; a quorum for this purpose shau^ 
consist of a member or members from two-thirds of the stote^jj 
and a majority of all the states shall be necessary to a c n 0 1 ( ?gl 
And if the House of Representatives shall not choose Taj-
President whenever the right of choice shall devolve uP?r,j| 
them, before the fourth day of March next following, then tjjgj 
Vice-President shall act as President, as in the case of t 
death or other constitutional disability of the President.--'AD 
person having the greatest number of votes as Vice-Presideff 
shall be the Vice-President, if such number be a majority of _ 
whole number of Electors appointed, and if no person hav _J 
majority, then from the two highest numbers on the list, 
Senate shall choose the Vice-President; a quorum for 
purpose shall consist of two-thirds of the whole n u j n ^ T |, 
Senators, and a majority of the whole number S^^:A 
necessary to a choice. But no person constitutionally m y f r * 2 
to the office of President shall be eligible to that of
 A 
President of the United States. 
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substantial evidence to support the charge and the court 
inds by clear and convincing evidence that the person 
vould constitute a substantial danger to any other person 
>r to the community or is likely to flee the jurisdiction of 
;he court if released on bail. 
Persons convicted of a crime are bailable pending appeal 
as prescribed by law. 1988 (2nd s.S.) 
9. [Excessive ba i l a n d fines — C r u e l p u n i s h -
ments . ] 
cessive bail shall not be required; excessive fines shall not 
nposed; nor shall cruel and unusual punishments be 
ted. Persons arrested or imprisoned shall not be treated 
unnecessary rigor. 1896 
10. [Trial by jury . ] 
capital cases the right of trial by jury shall remain 
late. In capital cases the jury shall consist of twelve 
>ns, and in all other felony cases, the jury shall consist of 
wer than eight persons. In other cases, the Legislature 
establish the number of jurors by statute, but in no event 
a jury consist of fewer than four persons. In criminal 
; the verdict shall be unanimous. In civil cases three-
hs of the jurors may find a verdict. A jury in civil cases 
be waived unless demanded. 1996 
11. [Cour t s o p e n — R e d r e s s of in jur ies . ] 
courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done 
Lm in his person, property or reputation, shall have 
dy by due course of law, which shall be administered 
Dut denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be 
id from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in 
State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is 
ty. 1896 
12. [Rights of a c c u s e d pe r sons . ] 
criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to 
ar and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the 
re and cause of the accusation against him, to have a copy 
;of, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the 
2sses against him, to have compulsory process to compel 
attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a 
iy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or 
ict in which the offense is alleged to have been committed, 
the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any 
sed person, before final judgment, be compelled to ad-
e money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed, 
accused shall not be compelled to give evidence against 
elf; a wife shall not be compelled to testify against her 
and, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any person 
/ice put in jeopardy for the same offense, 
lere the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary 
lination, the function of tha t examination is limited to 
•mining whether probable cause exists unless otherwise 
ded by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall pre-
i the use of reliable hearsay evidence as defined by s tatute 
le in whole or in part at any preliminary examination to 
•mine probable cause or at any pretrial proceeding with 
set to release of the defendant if appropriate discovery is 
red as defined by statute or rule. 1994 
13. [ P r o s e c u t i o n b y i n f o r m a t i o n o r i n d i c t m e n t — 
G r a n d jury . ] 
fenses heretofore required to be prosecuted by indict-
;, shall be prosecuted by information after examination 
commitment by a magistrate, unless the examination be 
ed by the accused with the consent of the State, or by 
tment, with or without such examination and commit-
:. The formation of the grand jury and the powers and 
»s thereof shall be as prescribed by the Legislature. 1947 
Sec. 14. [ U n r e a s o n a b l e s e a r c h e s f o r b i d d e n — Issu-
a n c e of w a r r a n t . ] 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures 
shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon 
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to 
be seized. 1896 
Sec. 15. [ F r e e d o m of s p e e c h a n d of t h e p r e s s — Libel.] 
No law shall be passed to abridge or restrain the freedom of 
speech or of the press. In all criminal prosecutions for libel the 
t ruth may be given in evidence to the jury; and if it shall 
appear to the jury tha t the matter charged as libelous is true, 
and was published with good motives, and for justifiable ends, 
the party shall be acquitted; and the jury shall have the right 
to determine the law and the fact. 18% 
Sec. 16. [No i m p r i s o n m e n t for d e b t — Excep t ion . ] 
There shall be no imprisonment for debt except in cases of 
absconding debtors. 1896 
Sec. 17. [E lec t ions to b e free — So ld ie r s vot ing. ] 
All elections shall be free, and no power, civil or military, 
shall at any time interfere to prevent the free exercise of the 
right of suffrage. Soldiers, in time of war, may vote at their 
post of duty, in or out of the State, under regulations to be 
prescribed by law. 18% 
Sec. 18. [ A t t a i n d e r — E x pos t facto l aws — I m p a i r i n g 
c o n t r a c t s . ] 
No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the 
obligation of contracts shall be passed. 1896 
Sec. 19. [Treason def ined — Proof . ] 
Treason against the State shall consist only in levying war 
against it, or in adhering to its enemies or in giving them aid 
and comfort. No person shall be convicted of treason unless on 
the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act. 1896 
Sec. 20. [Mil i ta ry s u b o r d i n a t e to t h e civil power . ] 
The military shall be in strict subordination to the civil 
power, and no soldier in time of peace, shall be quartered in 
any house without the consent of the owner; nor in time of war 
except in a manner to be prescribed by law. 1896 
Sec. 2 1 . [S lavery fo rb idden . ] 
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a 
punishment for crime, whereof the party shall have been duly 
convicted, shall exist within this State. 1896 
Sec. 22. [ P r i v a t e p r o p e r t y for p u b l i c use . ] .\:"t 
Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public 
use without just compensation. i"f 
Sec. 23 . [ I r r e v o c a b l e f r a n c h i s e s fo rb idden . ] 
No law shall be passed granting irrevocably any franchise, ; 
privilege or immunity. 189* 
Sec. 24. [Uni form o p e r a t i o n of laws.] 
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation- •jg&fe 
189* 
Sec. 25. [R igh t s r e t a i n e d b y people . ] i"& 
This enumeration of rights shall not be construed to imp*? 
or deny others retained by the people. l88F. 
i ' * Sec. 26. [P rov i s i ons m a n d a t o r y a n d proh ib i to ry . ] 
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587 UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE Rule 27 
reasons for the supplemental citations. Any response shall be 
made within 7 days of filing and shall be similarly limited. 
(j) Requirements and sanctions. All briefs under this rule 
must be concise, presented with accuracy, logically arranged 
with proper headings and free from burdensome, irrelevant, 
immaterial or scandalous matters. Briefs which are not in 
compliance may be disregarded or stricken, on motion or sua 
sponte by the court, and the court may assess attorney fees 
against the offending lawyer. 
(k) Brief covers. The covers of all briefs shall be of heavy 
cover stock and shall comply with Rule 27. 
Rule 25. Brief of an amicus curiae or guardian ad l i tem. 
A brief of an amicus curiae or of a guardian ad litem 
representing a minor who is not a party to the appeal may be 
filed only if accompanied by written consent of all parties, or 
by leave of court granted on motion or at the request of the 
court. A motion for leave shall identify the interest of the 
applicant and shall state the reasons why a brief of an amicus 
curiae or the guardian ad litem is desirable. Except as all 
parties otherwise consent, an amicus curiae or guardian ad 
litem shall file its brief within the time allowed the party 
whose position as to affirmance or reversal the amicus curiae 
or guardian ad litem will support, unless the court for cause 
shown otherwise orders. A motion of an amicus curiae or 
guardian ad litem to participate in the oral argument will be 
granted when circumstances warrant in the court's discretion. 
Rule 26. Fi l ing and s e rv i ce of briefs. 
(a) Time for service and filing briefs. Briefs shall be deemed 
filed on the date of the postmark if first-class mail is utilized. 
The appellant shall serve and file a brief within 40 days after 
date of notice from the clerk of the appellate court pursuant to 
Rule 13, unless a motion for summary disposition of the 
appeal or a motion to remand for determination of ineffective 
assistance of counsel has been previously interposed, in which 
event service and filing shall be within 30 days from the denial 
of such motion. The appellee, or in cases involving a cross-
appeal, the appellee/cross-appellant, shall serve and file a 
brief within 30 days after service of the appellant's brief. In 
cases involving cross-appeals, the appellant shall serve and 
file the second brief described in Rule 24(g) within 30 days 
after service of the appellee/cross-appellant's brief. A reply 
brief may be served and filed by the appellant or the appellee/ 
cross-appellant in cases involving cross-appeals. If a reply 
brief is filed, it shall be served and filed within 30 days after 
the filing and service of the appellee's brief or the appellant's 
second brief in cases involving cross-appeals. If oral argument 
is scheduled fewer than 35 days after the filing of appellee's 
brief, the reply brief must be filed at least 5 days prior to oral 
argument. By stipulation filed with the court in accordance 
with Rule 21(a), the parties may extend each of such periods 
for no more than 30 days. A motion for enlargement of time 
need not accompany the stipulation. No such stipulation shall 
be effective unless it is filed prior to the expiration of the 
period sought to be extended. 
(b) Number of copies to be filed and served. For matters 
pending in the Supreme Court, ten copies of each brief, one of 
which shall contain an original signature, shall be filed with 
the Clerk of the Supreme Court. For matters pending in the 
Court of Appeals, eight copies of each brief, one of which shall 
contain an original signature, shall be filed with the Clerk of 
the Court of Appeals. Two copies shall be served on counsel for 
each party separately represented. 
(c) Consequence of failure to file briefs. If an appellant fails 
to file a brief within the time provided in this rule, or within 
the time as may be extended by order of the appellate court, an 
appellee may move for dismissal of the appeal. If an appellee 
fails to file a brief within the time provided by this rule, or 
within the time as may be extended by order of the appellate 
court, an appellant may move that the appellee not be heard 
at oral argument. 
(d) Return of record to the clerk. Each par ty upon the filing 
of its brief, shall return the record to the clerk of the court 
having custody pursuant to these rules. 
Rule 27. Form of briefs. 
(a) Paper size; printing margins. Briefs shall be typewrit-
ten, printed or prepared by photocopying or other duplicating 
or copying process that will produce clear, black and perma-
nent copies equally legible to printing, on opaque, unglazed 
paper 8 1/2 inches wide and 11 inches long, and shall be 
securely bound along the left margin. Paper may be recycled 
paper, with or without deinking. The printing must be double 
spaced, except for matter customarily single spaced and in-
dented. Margins shall be at least one inch on the top, bottom 
and sides of each page. Page numbers may appear in the 
margins. 
(b) typeface. Either a proportionally spaced or monospaced 
typeface in a plain, roman style may be used. A proportionally 
spaced typeface must be 13-point or larger for both text and 
footnotes. Examples are CG Times, Times New Roman, New 
Century, Bookman and Garamond. A monospaced typeface 
may not contain more than ten characters per inch for both 
text and footnotes. Examples are Pica and Courier. 
(c) Binding. Briefs shall be printed on both sides of the 
page, and bound with a compact-type binding so as not unduly 
to increase the thickness of the brief along the bound side. 
Coiled plastic and spiral-type bindings are not acceptable. 
(d) Color of cover; contents of cover. The cover of the opening 
brief of appellant shall be blue; that of appellee, red; that of 
intervenor, guardian ad litem, or amicus curiae, green; that of 
any reply brief, or in cases involving a cross-appeal, the 
appellant's second brief, gray; that of any petition for rehear-
ing, tan; that of any response to a petition for rehearing, 
white; that of a petition for certiorari, white; that of a response 
to a petition for certiorari, orange; and that of a reply to the 
response to a petition for certiorari, yellow. All brief covers 
shall be of heavy cover stock. There shall be adequate contrast 
between the printing and the color of the cover. The cover of all 
briefs shall set forth in the caption the full title given to the 
case in the court or agency from which the appeal was taken. 
as modified pursuant to Rule 3(g), as well as the designation of 
the parties both as they appeared in the lower court or agency 
and as they appear in the appeal. In addition, the covers shall 
contain: the name of the appellate court; the number of the 
case in the appellate court opposite the case title; the priority 
number of the case, as set forth in Rule 29; the title of the 
document (e.g., Brief of Appellant); the nature of the proceed-
ing in the appellate court (e.g.. Appeal. Petition for Review); 
the name of the court and judge, agency or board below; and 
the names and addresses of counsel for the respective parties 
designated as attorney for appellant, petitioner, appellee, or 
respondent, as the case may be. The names of counsel for the 
party filing the document shall appear in the lower right and 
opposing counsel in the lower left of the cover. 
(e) Effect of non-compliance with rules. The clerk shall 
examine all briefs before filing. If they are not prepared in 
accordance with these rules, they will not be filed but shall be 
returned to be properly prepared. The clerk shall retain one 
copy of the non-complying brief and the party shall file a brief 
prepared in compliance with these rules within 5 days. The 
party whose brief has been rejected under this provision shall 
immediately notify the opposing party in writing of the 
lodging. The clerk may grant additional time for bringing a 
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